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PUNISHING CRIMINALS FOR THEIR CONDUCT:
A RETURN TO REASON FOR THE ARMED
CAREER CRIMINAL ACT
SHELDON A. EVANS*
Abstract
For over twenty-five years, the Armed Career Criminal Act has
produced inconsistent results and has taxed judicial economy perhaps more
than any other federal sentencing mechanism. This recidivist sentencing
enhancement is meant to punish habitual criminals based on their
numerous past crimes, but the Supreme Court’s application of the Act too
often allows habitual criminals to escape the intended enhancement on a
legal technicality. This comes as a result of the Court’s categorical
approach, which punishes habitual criminal offenders based on the
statutory elements of their past crimes rather than the conduct of their past
crimes.
In an effort to find solutions for this ailing doctrine, this Article analyzes
how states have structured their own recidivist sentencing laws to avoid the
same problems wreaking havoc in the federal courts. Of all the state
approaches, a conduct-based approach is most promising because of its
practical application and ideological consistency. Moreover, the many
roadblocks articulated by the Court over the years that have supposedly
prevented it from taking a conduct-based approach are overcome after
considering the constitutional and practical sentencing landscape.
I. Introduction
Mathis v. United States,1 the Supreme Court’s latest foray into its Armed
Career Criminal Act (ACCA or “Act”)2 jurisprudence, has become the apex
of the doctrine’s problematic approach to sentencing habitual criminal
offenders.

* B.A., University of Southern California, 2008; J.D., University of Chicago, 2012.
The author would like to thank Jayeeta Kundu and John O’Hara for their valuable insights
into this Article, as well as the Legal Scholarship Workshops at the University of Chicago
Law School and the Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law.
1. 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016).
2. 18 U.S.C. 924(e) (2012).
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The Mathis case began in small-town Iowa, where panic swept over a
family when their teenage boy went missing.3 Little did they know at the
time that he had been lured to run away to a middle-aged, repeat criminal
offender’s house via online chats.4 This man with the checkered past,
Richard Mathis, forcibly molested the boy and intended to do the same to
two other young boys staying in the house during the same time.5 When
police tracked the victim’s phone to Mathis’s house and eventually
executed a search warrant, they found a cell phone with sexually explicit
messages Mathis had sent to other young boys and a memory card
containing child pornography.6 In addition, law enforcement officers found
a loaded rifle, which Mathis was not allowed to possess as a previously
convicted felon.7 Needless to say, this was only Mathis’s latest criminal
episode, one more to add to a long list of prior convictions and arrests; in
addition to five past burglary convictions,8 Mathis also had a troubling
history of sexually abusing young boys.9
The ACCA was meant for habitual offenders like Mathis. The ACCA is
a federal sentencing enhancement designed to punish felons more severely
if they have three previous convictions for “violent felonies.”10 Burglary
convictions, of which Mathis had many, are specifically referred to in the
Act as violent felonies.11 Thus, in Mathis’s case, the government decided to
forego child molestation charges and instead charged Mathis with being a
felon in possession of a firearm12—a crime which, combined with his
previous Iowa burglary convictions, triggered the ACCA sentencing
enhancement. Mathis pleaded guilty and the district court later applied the
ACCA, sentencing Mathis to 180 months of imprisonment.13

3. Mathis v. United States, 786 F.3d 1068, 1070 (8th Cir. 2015), rev'd, 136 S. Ct. 2243
(2016).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2234, 2246 (2016).
9. Brief of Appellee at 21-22, Mathis, 786 F.3d 1068 (No. 14-2396).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012).
11. Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
12. Mathis, 786 F.3d at 1070. The jockeying between the Missouri government—which
could have charged Mathis with more substantive crimes related to sexual abuse of minors—
and the federal government cannot be discerned from the record. It is likely that Missouri
deferred to the federal government’s prosecution given its greater resources and stronger
sentencing standards.
13. Id. at 1070–71.
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Unfortunately, the Supreme Court found that the ACCA’s increased
punishment should not apply to Mathis because of a legal technicality. The
Supreme Court decided many years ago that a categorical approach was the
best way to determine whether a prior state conviction for burglary
qualified as a “burglary” for purposes of the ACCA.14 Under the categorical
approach, sentencing judges cannot look to the offender’s conduct for the
prior burglary; rather, judges may only consider whether the elements of the
state burglary statute sufficiently coincide with the elements of the Court’s
own generic definition of burglary.15 If the elements do coincide, the past
burglary will qualify as a predicate offense to be counted towards the three
violent felonies necessary to apply the ACCA. If, however, the elements of
the state burglary statute do not match up, or if the state statute criminalizes
conduct that is broader than generic burglary, the past burglary will not
count as a predicate offense. Notably, if the state burglary statute presents
alternative sets of elements, courts may use a modified categorical
approach, examining the record of conviction to discern under which set of
elements the offender was convicted.16
In Mathis, explored further below, the Supreme Court overturned the
district court’s application of the ACCA because the Iowa burglary statute,
under which Mathis was convicted, criminalized conduct outside of the
Court’s narrow generic burglary definition. Mathis’s case is no isolated
incident. The categorical approach has been used for over a half-century in
criminal and immigration contexts, and often works in favor of the
convicted, who escape enhanced punishment based on legal fictions and
technicalities.17
If this categorical approach seems confusing, that’s because it is.
Commentators have referred to this doctrine as “an inconsistent patchwork
of decisions,”18 and even likened it to the rule against perpetuities “in terms
14. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600–02 (1990).
15. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2245 (2016). As the Supreme Court has
found, elements, which “are the constituent parts of a crime’s legal definition [that] must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain a conviction, . . . are distinct from ‘facts,’
which are mere real-world things” that are “extraneous to the crime’s legal requirements.”
Id.
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Guarino v. Uhl, 107 F.2d 399, 400 (2d Cir. 1939)
(Hand, J.) (recognizing that many immigrants who have committed serious offenses avoid
deportation because of the categorical approach’s focus on elements of an offense, rather
than the facts of the offender’s actual conduct).
18. Ted Koehler, Note, Assessing Divisibility in the Armed Career Criminal Act, 110
MICH. L. REV. 1521, 1523 (2012); see also Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 150 (2008)
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of its complexity . . . . ‘Even lawyers who regularly practice [criminal law]
can struggle to understand the doctrine and its occasionally perplexing
results.’”19 Judges have lamented over the categorical approach doctrine as
well, with one court going so far to say that in the twenty years since the
adoption of the categorical approach, it “has struggled to understand the
contours of the Supreme Court’s framework.”20
Even more fundamental than the categorical approach’s confusing
application are its ideological constraints. A “big drawback of the
categorical approach is that it cuts against the grain of our intuitions about
rough justice. . . . This last point cannot be stressed enough. The categorical
approach is completely insensitive to what happened here.”21 Common
sense and legal theory both tell us that offenders should be punished for
their conduct. For example, if a burglar enters someone’s home and steals
thousands of dollars of possessions, he or she should be punished for his or
her specific crimes. The categorical approach applied by the Supreme
Court, however, divorces what a habitual offender actually did from the
punishment they are meant to receive.
The practical and ideological problems presented by the categorical
approach have in turn increasingly taxed judicial economy. Judges have
rightfully complained that “[t]he dockets of . . . all federal courts are now
clogged with [ACCA] cases,”22 and that “no other area of the law has
demanded more of [the courts’] resources.”23 The very architect of the
ACCA himself, the late Senator Arlen Specter, expressed his
disappointment with the “costly and time-consuming [ACCA] litigation at
every level of the Federal court system.”24 With nearly ten percent of

(Scalia, J., concurring) (describing ACCA doctrine as “piecemeal, suspenseful, [and]
Scrabble-like”).
19. Jennifer Lee Koh, Rethinking Removability, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1803, 1834 (2013)
(quoting Doug Keller, Causing Mischief for Taylor’s Categorical Approach: Applying
“Legal Imagination” to Duenas-Alvarez, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 625, 625 (2011)).
20. United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 2011),
abrogated by Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013).
21. Evan Lee, Regulating Crimmigration 23 (Univ. of Cal. Hastings Coll. of Law,
Research Paper No. 128, 2015).
22. United States v. Vann, 660 F.3d 771, 787 (4th Cir. 2011) (Agee, J., concurring).
23. Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d at 917; see also Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1,
33 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (speculating that the Supreme Court would be analyzing
state law under the ACCA “until the cows come home”).
24. 156 CONG. REC. S10,516 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2010) (statement of Sen. Specter); see
also Avi M. Kupfer, Note, A Comprehensive Administrative Solution to the Armed Career
Criminal Act Debacle, 113 MICH. L. REV. 151, 152 (2014).
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federal firearm offenders being sentenced under the ACCA25 and an
estimated 7000 offenders currently serving these sentences,26 the strain that
the categorical approach puts on judicial economy must be addressed.
Given the doctrine’s well-documented problems, this Article seeks to
find an efficient and practical replacement that conforms with fundamental
notions of justice. In order to do so, this Article presents a comprehensive
look into how the states deal with these same problems in their own
habitual-offender statutes. Like the federal government’s ACCA, nearly
every state has sentencing enhancements that increase penalties for habitual
offenders. Like the ACCA, these state habitual-offender statutes consider
predicate offenses that offenders committed in other states. Unlike the
ACCA, however, the states have taken a range of different approaches that
offer simple application while achieving uniformity. Chief among these
approaches is a conduct-based approach, which not only conforms with
common-sense sentencing ideals (punishing criminals based on what they
actually did), but offers a practical solution to the difficult application of the
current categorical approach.
In exploring alternatives to the categorical approach, this Article
proceeds as follows. Part II discusses the ACCA’s legislative history and
the roots of the categorical approach in the Court’s jurisprudence. Part III
explores the ideological and practical tensions of the categorical approach.
In Part IV, the Article explains and justifies the methodology of analyzing
state practice to solve the federal categorical approach problem. Then, in
Part V, this Article explains possible solutions gleaned from the states and
ultimately argues that a conduct-based approach is the most effective
change to address the confusion-plagued categorical approach doctrine.
This Article then offers conclusory remarks by looking to the future and
commenting on the legal realism behind the Court’s current jurisprudence.

25. Douglas A. Berman, How Many Hundreds (or Thousands?) of ACCA Prisoners
Could Be Impacted by a Big Ruling in Johnson?, SENTENCING L. & POL’Y (June 13, 2015
10:07 AM), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2015/06/ how-manyhundreds-or-thousands-of-acca-prisoners-could-be-impacted-by-a-big-ruling-injohnson.html.
26. Id.; see also Jessica A. Roth, The Divisibility of Crime, 64 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 95, 97
n.7 (2015), https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&context=
dlj_online (finding that “approximately 600 criminal defendants per year have been
sentenced as Armed Career Criminals” under the Act).
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II. The Roots of the ACCA and the Categorical Approach
A. The Forgotten Intent of Legislative History
Habitual-offender laws like the ACCA enjoy a long tradition in this
country that dates back to colonial times.27 Enhancing an offender’s
sentence based on their criminal history has proved attractive for lawmakers
both from a policy and political standpoint. The ACCA, for example, was
championed in the early 1980s in the midst of a heightened fear of drugs
and crime,28 during which time politicians found it expedient to convey a
toughness on crime. More importantly, however, Congress was motivated
by criminology research suggesting that a small number of criminals were
responsible for committing a large percentage of crimes.29 Thus, Congress
believed that it could stymy rising crime rates by incapacitating habitual
offenders for longer periods of time.
In the “interest of public safety” and to adequately deal with the rising
threat of “armed repeat offenders who continue to commit serious

27. See Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 26 (1992) (“Statutes that punish recidivists more
severely than first offenders have a long tradition in this country that dates back to colonial
times.”); see also Ronald F. Wright, Three Strikes Legislation and Sentencing Commission
Objectives, 20 LAW & POL’Y 429, 441 (1998); Krystle Lamprecht, Comment, Formal,
Categorical, but Incomplete: The Need for a New Standard in Evaluating Prior Convictions
Under the Armed Carrier Criminal Act, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1407, 1412 (2008).
28. Michael Schearer, The Armed Career Criminal Act: Imprecise, Indeterminate, and
Unconstitutional 3 (Dec. 8, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2698973 (“In the two decades from 1960 to 1980, violent crime
in the United States rose by an astounding 271%. During the same time period, the burglary
rate increased by 231% and robbery increased by 318%. Similar increases were noted in
rates of forcible rape, aggravated assault, property crime, larceny, and motor vehicle theft.”)
(footnotes omitted).
29. United States v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210, 216 (3d Cir. 1987) (“Congress enacted the
Armed Career Criminal provision for the purpose of incapacitating particular repeat
offenders, who it found were responsible for a large proportion of crimes involving theft and
violence.”); see also S. REP. NO. 97-585, at 20 (1982) (citing evidence that “a small number
of repeat offenders commit a highly disproportionate amount of the violent crime plaguing
America today”); see also Schearer, supra note 28, at 4 (citing MARVIN E. WOLFGANG ET
AL., DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT (1972)) (finding that 6% of a study group was
responsible for “61% of all homicides, 76% of all rapes, 73% of all robberies, and 65% of all
aggravated assaults of those crimes perpetrated by members of the group”); id. (citing MARK
A. PETERSON ET AL., DOING CRIME: A SURVEY OF CALIFORNIA PRISON INMATES xii (1980))
(finding that 25% of sampling group of prison inmates were responsible for “58% of all
armed robberies, 65% of all burglaries, 60% of all motor vehicle thefts, and 46% of all
assaults of those crimes reported by members of the sample group”).
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offenses,”30 Congress explored ways to incapacitate career criminals.31 This
led members of Congress to introduce the ACCA as a three-strikes, strict
liability law which would have imposed a mandatory life sentence after a
third armed burglary or robbery.32 When Congress rejected this version on
account of its overly harsh punishment,33 then-Senator Arlen Specter
reintroduced the Act with its now-enacted fifteen-year mandatory minimum
sentence.34 The logic behind this fifteen-year sentence was based on data
that suggested that criminal careers commonly start at age fifteen and end at
age thirty.35 While this justification is rife with logical problems,36 it
ultimately proved more palatable to Congress than the mandatory life
sentences imposed by the original bill.
The ACCA finally became law as one small piece of the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984, which has been described as “the most
extensive change[] ever made to the federal criminal justice system.” 37 The
30. S. REP. NO. 98-190, at 7 (1983).
31. Jill C. Rafaloff, Note, The Armed Career Criminal Act: Sentence Enhancement
Statute or New Offense?, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1091 n.42 (1988) (quoting 130 CONG.
REC. H101,551 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984)) (quoting Rep. Ron Wyden) (“We simply must put a
stop to the career [criminals] . . . . [W]e all know that a slap on the wrist won’t be enough to
deter these criminals.”).
32. Jenny W.L. Osborne, Comment, One Day Criminal Careers: The Armed Career
Criminal Act’s Different Occasions Provision, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 963, 967 (2011)
(citing Career Criminal Life Sentence Act of 1981: Hearing on S. 1688, S. 1689, and S. 1690
Before the Subcomm. on Juvenile Justice of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong.
(1982)).
33. See infra notes 204–207 and accompanying text.
34. Osborne, supra note 32, at 967-68 (citing S. REP. NO. 1688, 97th Cong. (1982)).
35. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 97-585, at 77 (1983)) (explaining the rationale behind the
fifteen-year mandatory minimum).
36. Apart from the fact that this statistic has drastically changed since the 1980s, it also
suffers from inconsistent logic: in order to be eligible for this sentence, a minor at the age of
fifteen would have already had to commit several crimes. It is likely that by the time this
habitual offender even qualified for the fifteen-year sentence, he or she would be far into the
age of maturity. Then, if criminal activity usually ceased at age thirty, most sentences that
incarcerated criminals past that age would be overly harsh and ineffective. Also, this
justification did not account for the reality that many offenders would be further hardened
after fifteen years behind bars. Thus, an offender’s age is not nearly as determinative of
recidivism as is their past experience and rehabilitation to successfully reenter society with
the requisite opportunities needed to rebuild a life apart from crime. Nevertheless, these are
critiques that enjoy the luxury of hindsight, which the politicians in the early 1980s did not
enjoy.
37. Thomas O. Powell, The Armed Career Criminal Act—Proposing a New Test to
Resolve Difficulties in Applying the Act’s Ambiguous Residual Clause, BEPRESS 1 (Mar. 16,
2009), https://works.bepress.com/thomas_powell/1/download/.
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nuts and bolts of the ACCA mandated a fifteen-year mandatory minimum
prison term for offenders found guilty of being a felon in possession of a
firearm38 who had also previously committed three violent felonies or
serious drug crimes.39
The 1984 version of the law had a narrow scope and was only to be
applied to a “very small portion” of “hard core . . . career criminals.”40 The
law enumerated burglaries and robberies as “violent felonies” in part
because of the frequency of such offenses when compared to more
egregious violent crimes.41 Thus, for the most part, these crimes were
enumerated as “violent felonies” more because of their frequency than their
actual violence. Senator Specter, perhaps in hyperbole, also gained traction
for the law by declaring that “[r]obberies and burglaries are the most
damaging crimes to society.”42 As a result, Congress made it a priority to
incapacitate habitual property offenders because “in terms of the likelihood
of being victimized, burglary is the primary threat, followed by robbery.”43
When in committee, the language was amended to maximize this intent.
The original bill sought to punish burglary and robbery offenses “in
violation of the ‘statutes’ of the States and the United States,” but the term
“statute” was replaced by the broader term “laws” “to ensure that all
conduct which the Committee intended to make punishable under the new
offense was covered.”44 As if peering into a crystal ball, Congress also tried
to anticipate and fix potential problems that might arise from relying on
state law to determine ACCA predicates. Congress understood “that
culpable offenders might escape punishment on a technicality” due to “the
wide variation among states and localities in the ways that offenses are
labeled.”45 Realizing the potential confusion in application, Congress added
subsections that clearly defined what constituted predicate burglaries and
robberies for the Act.46 In particular, Congress defined burglary as “any
offense involving entering or remaining surreptitiously within a building
38. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012).
39. Id. § 924(e)(1).
40. Lamprecht, supra note 27, at 1411 (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-585, at 62-63 (1983)).
41. S. REP. NO. 98-190, at 5 (1984) (“Burglaries are 40 times more common than rapes,
and robberies are seven times more common than rapes.”); see also Armed Career Criminal
Act: Hearing on H.R. 1627 and S. 52 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 98th Cong. 6, 33 (1984).
42. H.R. REP. NO. 98-1073, at 3 (1984).
43. S. REP. NO. 98-190, at 5 (1984).
44. Id. at 18.
45. Id. at 20.
46. Id.
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that is the property of another with intent to engage in conduct constituting
a Federal or State offense.”47
Congress’s rationale for adopting these definitions and preventing
reliance on what a state statute might define as being “burglary” was rooted
in “fundamental fairness” and uniformity in sentencing habitual offenders
consistently, no matter the state in which they committed their previous
offenses. Thus, Congress wanted to acknowledge “the prerogatives of the
States in defining their own offenses,” but at the same time ensure “that the
same type of conduct is punishable on the Federal level in all cases.”48 This
made it clear that Congress had drafted the ACCA so that “it would not put
Federal courts in a position of having to interpret and apply State laws on
robbery and burglary in Federal criminal trials.”49
Congress was not quite finished tinkering with the ACCA, and passed
numerous amendments to the Act in 1986 to broaden its application.50
When Senator Specter introduced the amendments, he noted that since the
sentencing enhancement had been successful with classification of
burglaries and robberies serving as predicate crimes, “the time has come to
broaden that definition so that we may have a greater sweep and more
effective use of this important statute.”51
In an effort to expand the predicate offenses that triggered the higher
sentence, Congress replaced burglary and robbery crimes with three broad
categories of offenses. First, Congress added “serious drug trafficking
offenses,” which were in turn further defined by the statute.52 Second,
Congress added “violent felonies,” which included enumerated offenses
like burglary, robbery, extortion, and the use of explosives, as well as
offenses involving physical force against property.53 Third, Congress
sought to include violent felonies that involved the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of violence against a person.54

47. Id. at 2.
48. Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
49. H.R. REP. NO. 98-1073, at 5–6 (1984) (emphasis added).
50. See The Armed Career Criminal Act Amendments: Hearing on S. 2312 Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 1 (1986)
(statement of Sen. Arlen Specter, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (claiming that only
including burglary and robbery as predicate offenses was too limited, and that the ACCA
should be amended to include additional predicate offenses).
51. 132 CONG. REC. 7697 (1986).
52. H.R. REP. No. 99-849, at 3 (1986).
53. Id.
54. Id.
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Yet another crucial change in 1986, which may have singlehandedly
created the mire of ACCA jurisprudence, was the deletion of the statutory
definitions of burglary and robbery.55 While the legislative history on the
deletion of these definitions is silent,56 later developments suggest the
deletion was merely an inadvertent, yet costly, mistake in draftsmanship.57
When then-Senator Joseph Biden introduced a bill in 1989 to address the
issue, he explained that the bill “corrects an error that occurred
inadvertently when the definition of burglary was deleted from the Armed
Career Criminal statute in 1986. The amendment reenacted the original
definition, which was intended to be broader than common law burglary.” 58
The Senate passed the uncontroversial bill 100-0 and then sent it to the
House, where it never made it past the House desk.59 As a result of this
enduring mistake, courts have had no choice but to give meaning to
Congress’s omission.60 Thus, courts have had to assume that Congress, for
some unknown reason, meant to leave out the definition of burglary. 61
Perhaps the inexcusable inaction of the House, too, can be categorized as an
“inadvertent mistake” that has now produced one of the most muddled
criminal sentencing doctrines in American jurisprudence.
This omission was not the only offense in draftsmanship that has
contributed to the current mess of ACCA doctrine. In the immediate
aftermath of the ACCA’s enactment, the language was so poorly drafted 62
55. See Career Criminals Amendment Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, Subtitle I, Sec.
1402(2), § 924(e)(2), 100 Stat. 3207, 39-40 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)
(2012)).
56. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 582 (1990).
57. Id. at 589–90 n.5.
58. Id. (quoting 135 CONG. REC. 23519) (statement of Sen. Biden).
59. See A Bill to Implement the President’s 1989 Drug Control Strategy, S. 1711, 101st
Cong. (1989), https://www.congress.gov/bill/101st-congress/senate-bill/1711/all-actionswithout-amendments (showing that the last recorded legislative action for Senate Bill 1711
was on October 18, 1989, where the record indicates it was being held at the House desk).
60. See Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2287 (2013) (“If Congress had
wanted to increase a sentence based on the facts of a prior offense, it presumably would have
said so; other statutes, in other contexts, speak in just that way.”); Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600–
01; see also Inhabitants of Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883) (stating that
courts must “give effect . . . to every clause and word of a statute, avoiding, if it may be, any
construction which implies that the legislature was ignorant” or made a mistake).
61. James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 230 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to
the ACCA as a “drafting failure”), overruled by Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551
(2015).
62. Rafaloff, supra note 31, at 1090 (citing United States v. Jackson, 824 F.2d 21, 25
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (“Lamentably, the ACCA . . . was not meticulously drafted . . . .”); see, e.g.,
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that courts could not even agree on whether the Act was a separate federal
offense or merely a sentencing enhancement to existing offenses.63 Soon
after such problems arose, the Supreme Court stepped in to provide needed
clarification on the interpretation and application of the Act. Unfortunately,
over a quarter century later, we are still ironically dealing with the
additional problems introduced by the Court in its effort to simplify
interpretation of the ACCA.
B. From Taylor to Mathis: The Circle of Strife
“This categorical approach requires courts to choose the right
category. And sometimes the choice is not obvious.”
Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 126 (2009).
1. Taylor and the Categorical Approach
The Court’s first journey down its rocky jurisprudential path came in
Taylor v. United States,64 in which the Court addressed the Act’s
application to predicate burglary offenses.65 Arthur Lajuane Taylor pleaded
guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm,66 and had a long criminal
record that included robbery, assault, and two second-degree burglaries in
Missouri.67 In light of his record, the district court ultimately applied the
ACCA and sentenced Taylor to the fifteen-year mandatory minimum.
Unfortunately, since Congress had deleted the definition of “burglary”
from the Act in its 1986 amendments, the lower courts had disagreed on
how to define the term. The Eighth Circuit upheld the district court’s
application of the Act because it reasoned that “burglary” should
correspond with whatever the states label as burglary in their criminal
code.68 If a state defined an offense as burglary, it reasoned, the federal
courts should defer to this state-law label regardless of the elements of the
state offense. Other courts reasoned that in the absence of a statutory
definition, the courts should defer to the common law definition of
United States v. Rush, 840 F.2d 574, 577 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (finding that the plain
language and structure of ACCA was inconclusive).
63. Rafaloff, supra note 31, at 1087.
64. 495 U.S. 575 (1990).
65. Id. at 577–78.
66. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012).
67. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 578.
68. Id. at 579, 580 n.2 (citing United States v. Taylor, 864 F.2d 625, 627 (8th Cir. 1989)
(defining burglary according to state law), rev’d, 495 U.S. 575 (1990); United States v.
Leonard, 868 F.2d 1393, 1399 (5th Cir. 1989), abrogated by Taylor, 495 U.S. 575).
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burglary.69 Regardless of whether a defendant was convicted of burglary as
defined by a state’s law, the burglary conviction should only serve as an
ACCA predicate if it would have been a burglary under the common law.
Still other courts looked to the Act’s 1984 definition of burglary to
determine if a state law burglary conviction qualified as a predicate
offense.70 To these courts, it was “not readily apparent whether Congress
intended ‘burglary’ to mean whatever the State of the defendant’s prior
conviction defines as burglary, or whether it intended that some uniform
definition of burglary be applied to all cases in which the Government seeks
a § 924(e) enhancement.”71
With this disagreement serving as a backdrop, the Supreme Court
examined the Act’s legislative history and rightly found it “implausible that
Congress intended the meaning of ‘burglary’ . . . to depend on the definition
adopted by the State of conviction.” This would mean that a person may or
may not “receive a sentence enhancement based on exactly the same
conduct, depending on whether the State of his prior conviction happened
to call that conduct ‘burglary.’”72 Instead, the Court found that Congress
intended for “the same type of conduct” to be “punishable on the Federal
level in all cases.”73
Next, the Court sought to establish a uniform definition of burglary to be
used for purposes of determining predicate offenses under the Act. Citing a
respected criminal law treatise,74 the Court generically defined burglary as
“having the basic elements of unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or
remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime.” 75 The

69. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 592, 580 n.2 (citing United States v. Chatman, 869 F.2d 525,
530 (9th Cir. 1989) (defining burglary according to common law), abrogated by Taylor, 495
U.S. 575; United States v. Headspeth, 852 F.2d 753, 757 (4th Cir. 1988), abrogated by
Taylor, 495 U.S. 575).
70. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 580 n.2 (citing United States v. Palmer, 871 F.2d 1202,
1205–07 (3d. Cir. 1989) (defining burglary as any offense that would have met the definition
of burglary under a predecessor statute to § 924(e)); United States v. Taylor, 882 F.2d 1018,
1027–28 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. Dombrowski, 877 F.2d 520, 530 (7th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Hill, 863 F.2d 1575, 1581–82 (11th Cir. 1989)).
71. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 580.
72. Id. at 590-91.
73. Id. at 582 (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-190, at 5 (1983)) (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 598 (citing 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE
CRIMINAL LAW § 8.13, at 464 (1st ed. 1986)).
75. Id. at 599.
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Court justified this definition by noting that it was “practically identical to
the 1984 definition,”76 and so was likely in line with congressional intent.
With this uniform definition in hand, the Court implemented the
categorical approach. This approach required sentencing courts to compare
the elements of the prior state criminal offense to the elements of generic
burglary.77 If the elements of the state crime were within or narrower than
the elements of generic burglary, the crime fit within the category of ACCA
predicate offenses. If the state crime elements were different or broader
than the generic offense, the opposite was true. Thus, the Court took a
slightly unintuitive approach by interpreting a criminal sentencing statute to
punish a habitual offender based on the elements of his prior offense, as
opposed to punishing him for the conduct of his prior offense.78
The Court justified its approach by looking to the language of the Act,
which seemed to place an emphasis on the statutory elements of a prior
state conviction, rather than the conduct that gave rise to the conviction.
First, the Court noted that § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) of the Act called for the
sentence enhancement when a criminal had been convicted of a crime “that
has as an element—not any crime that, in a particular case, involves—the
use or threat of force.”79 Thus, the Court reasoned that this emphasis on
elements should bleed into the following subsection that identified burglary
as a “violent felony” predicate.80
Second, the Court reasoned that Congress intended for courts to look to
the elements of previous convictions, rather than to the conduct underlying
those convictions.81 The Court’s argument was based on silence, stating that
“[i]f Congress had meant to adopt an approach that would require the
sentencing court to engage in an elaborate factfinding process regarding the
defendant’s prior offenses, surely this would have been mentioned
somewhere in the legislative history.”82 In other words, the Court argued
that Congress intended a categorical approach based on what it did not say.
Third, the Court believed that a conduct-based approach would present
practical difficulties that would require trial courts to undertake
burdensome fact-finding inquiries to determine the conduct of the prior

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 598.
Id. at 600.
Id.
Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (1988)).
Id. at 600–01; 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601.
Id.
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offense.83 For example, would the record of the previous conviction even
reveal the offender’s criminal conduct? If not, would the parties have to
examine witnesses from the prior criminal proceedings to determine the
facts that gave rise to the previous conviction? If a sentencing court made
such a determination, would that abridge a criminal defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial? Also, if a criminal pleaded guilty to a
lesser crime than burglary in a previous conviction, would it be fair to hold
him accountable as having committed burglary if his criminal conduct were
within the bounds of generic burglary?84 While the Court posed these
questions, it did little to actually answer them. Instead, it used them to
justify an elements-based, categorical approach as a way of practically
simplifying the process. After all, what could go wrong when trying to
determine whether the statutory elements of fifty different state definitions
of burglary fit within the bounds of the generic limits?
2. Taylor and the Modified Categorical Approach
Ironically, just as soon as the Court denounced the practical difficulties
of delving into the record of prior convictions, it outlined a clear doctrine
for courts to do just that. The Court realized that there would be some cases
in which a state criminal statute may sweep more broadly than the narrow
generic definition of burglary. These “divisible” state statutes presented
“multiple, alternative versions of the crime.”85 By way of example, the
Court stated that many states’ “burglary statutes . . . define burglary more
broadly” than the generic definition “by including places, such as
automobiles and vending machines, other than buildings.”86 In this “narrow
range of cases,” the Court instructed sentencing courts to “look beyond the
statutory elements [of the prior crime] to ‘the charging paper and jury
instructions’ used in [the previous criminal proceeding].”87 Therefore, when
a state burglary statute has “alternative elements”— for example, a burglary
statute that prohibits entry into an automobile as well as a building—the
sentencing court could use this “modified categorical approach” to look at a
set of documents from the previous conviction to determine under which
elements the defendant was actually convicted: the elements that fit within
the generic burglary of buildings, or the elements that fall outside the

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id. at 601-02.
Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2284 (2013).
Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599.
Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2283-84 (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602).
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generic definition, such as burgling an automobile.88 If the former, that
conviction would count as one of the three necessary predicate offenses to
apply the sentencing enhancement of the Act; if the latter, the opposite
would be true.
After laying out these complex theoretical doctrines, the Court turned
back to the case at hand. In order for Taylor to be subject to a fifteen-year
minimum sentence under the Act, he first had to be found guilty of being a
felon in possession of a firearm in the present case. Second, he had to have
at least three prior convictions for “violent felonies” as defined by the Act.89
Taylor conceded that his prior convictions for robbery and assault were
violent felonies, but challenged whether his convictions for burglary should
be considered violent felonies.90 When Taylor was convicted of seconddegree burglary in Missouri, the Missouri Code contained seven different
second-degree burglary statutes, all of which “varied as to the type of
structure and the means of entry involved” to be burgled.91 After the Court
employed the modified categorical approach and examined the “sparse
record,” it could not determine which of the seven statutes served the basis
for Taylor’s conviction; as a result, the Court remanded the case to the
Eighth Circuit.92
3. The Taylor Hypothetical Comes to Life in Shepard
The next time the Court addressed application of the ACCA was in
Shepard v. United States,93 in which the Court sought to define exactly
which types of documents courts could rely upon when employing the
modified categorical approach.94 In Shepard, “the hypothetical [the Court]
posited in Taylor became real”95 because the defendant had previously
pleaded guilty to violating Massachusetts’s burglary statute, which

88. Id. at 2284.
89. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2012).
90. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 579.
91. See id. at 578 n.1 (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 560.045 (1969) (breaking and entering a
dwelling house); id. § 560.050 (having entered a dwelling house, breaking out of it); id. §§
560.055, 560.060 (breaking an inner door); id. § 560.070 (breaking and entering a building,
booth, tent, boat, or railroad car); id. § 560.075 (breaking and entering a bank; id. § 560.080
(breaking and entering a vacant building)).
92. Id. at 602.
93. 544 U.S. 13 (2005).
94. Id. at 16.
95. Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2284 (2013) (discussing Shepard).
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“cover[ed] entries into ‘boats and cars’ as well as buildings.”96 Just as the
Court had contemplated in Taylor:
No one could know, just from looking at the statute, which
version of the offense Shepard was convicted of. Accordingly,
[the Court] again authorized sentencing courts to scrutinize a
restricted set of materials . . . to determine if the defendant had
pleaded guilty to entering a building or, alternatively, a car or
boat.97
The Court expressly limited these reviewable materials—later called
Shepard documents—to the “charging document, written plea agreement,
transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial
judge.”98
When the Court limited its inquiry to the Shepard documents, it
overturned the lower courts’ decision to apply the ACCA to the offender
because it had relied upon police reports and complaint applications to
perform the categorical analysis.99 Even though the record showed that the
defendant had never disputed that he indeed broke into a building (which
would categorically qualify as a predicate ACCA offense), the Court
nevertheless reversed his sentence based on the technicality of which
documents were examined under the confusing modified categorical
approach.100
4. The Dicta of Descamps and Its Second Footnote
The Court continued down this rabbit hole of legal fiction in Descamps
v. United States,101 which introduced yet another level of confusion to the
categorical approach. In Descamps, the Court held that a prior conviction
under a California burglary statute102 could not serve as an ACCA predicate

96. Id. (quoting Shepard, 544 U.S. at 17).
97. Id. (citing Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26).
98. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16.
99. Id. at 18, 26.
100. Id. at 23 (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990); Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172–173 (1989) (commenting on the importance of
stare decisis, following the doctrine as laid out in Taylor, and noting “[c]onsiderations of
stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation, for here, unlike in the
context of constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is implicated, and Congress
remains free to alter what we have done”)).
101. 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013).
102. CAL. PENAL CODE § 459 (West 2017).
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because it did not contain a necessary element of generic burglary. 103
Whereas generic burglary required “an unlawful entry along the lines of
breaking and entering,”104 the California burglary statute had no such
“unlawful entry” requirement.105 Consequently, because it was unnecessary
for California to prove that the defendant “broke and entered,” a California
burglary conviction could not serve as an ACCA predicate.106 The Court
expressly disavowed an analysis of the defendant’s conduct—whether he
“did break and enter makes no difference.”107
The holding of the case, however, is somewhat inconsequential when
compared to its dicta, which cleaved a deep circuit split regarding the
categorical and modified categorical approaches. The Court confirmed that
the modified categorical approach only comes into play when a statute is
divisible—that is, when it presents an alternative set of elements of which
one set corresponds with generic burglary and the other set does not.108
Consequently, a court cannot use the modified categorical approach to
glean information from prior conviction documents when the convicting
statute only has one set of indivisible elements.109 As it had before,110 the
Court offered as an example of a divisible statute, one that that
criminalizes assault with any of eight specified weapons; and
suppose further . . . that only assault with a gun counts as an
ACCA offense. A later sentencing court need only check the
charging documents and instructions . . . to determine whether in
convicting a defendant under that divisible statute, the jury
necessarily found that he committed the ACCA-qualifying
crime.111
In the Court’s second footnote, it responded to a dissent, authored by
Justice Alito, which raised the issue of whether the Court’s previous
holdings and examples highlighted different elements, or merely different
factual means of fulfilling that element.112 The Court stated that “if, as the
103. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2292–93.
104. Id. at 2285 (citing 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 21.1(a) (2d
ed. 2003)) (emphasis added).
105. Id. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 459 (2017)).
106. Id. at 2285-86.
107. Id. at 2286.
108. Id. at 2290.
109. Id.
110. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990).
111. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2290.
112. Id. at 2285 n.5.
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dissent claims, the state laws at issue in [previous] cases set out ‘merely
alternative means, not alternative elements’ of an offense, that is news to
us.”113 Further, the Court stated that it could “see no real-world reason to
worry” about such a distinction because whether a statute lists elements or
means, the documents approved by the Court in Taylor and Shepard reflect
the elements of the crime.114 The Court instructed that lower courts “need
not parse state law . . . [but,] [w]hen a state law is drafted in the alternative,
the court[s] merely resort[] to the approved documents and compare[] the
elements revealed there to those of the generic offense.”115
The crucial issue the Court failed to address, however, was how to
determine what is an element and what is a mean. For years, the Court—in
both Taylor and Shepard—stated that statutes listing alternative places that
could be burgled (a building or an automobile) were divisible and should be
subject to the modified categorical approach. In footnote two, the Court
manufactured doubt as to whether these statutes were truly divisible after
twenty-five years of jurisprudence suggesting that they were. As a result,
the courts of appeals quickly split on this very question.116
5. The Circle Is Complete: Mathis Contradicts the Practical Concerns of
Taylor
In Mathis, the Court finally resolved the elements versus means
question; in doing so, it also obliviously contradicted its own decisions in
Taylor and Shepard. The Court rightfully declared that for twenty-five
years, its “decisions have held that [a] prior crime qualifies as an ACCA
predicate if, but only if, its elements are the same as, or narrower than,

113. Id. (citing Justice Alito’s dissent).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See United States v. Mathis, 786 F.3d 1068, 1075 n.6 (2015) (comparing United
States v. Royal, 731 F.3d 333, 341 (4th Cir. 2013) (“Rather than alternative elements, then,
‘offensive physical contact’ and ‘physical harm’ are merely alternative means of satisfying a
single element of the Maryland offense.”), and United States v. Howard, 742 F.3d 1334,
1348–49 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding that a disjunctive “or” statement that listed alternative
places that could be burgled were “illustrative examples” and not “alternative elements”),
and Rendon v. Holder, 764 F.3d 1077, 1086 (9th Cir. 2014) (“To be clear, it is black-letter
law that a statute is divisible only if it contains multiple alternative elements, as opposed to
multiple alternative means. Thus, when a court encounters a statute that is written in the
disjunctive (that is, with an ‘or’), that fact alone cannot end the divisibility inquiry.” (citation
omitted)), with United States v. Prater, 766 F.3d 501, 510 (6th Cir. 2014) (finding a New
York statute divisible when it listed several alternative places that could be burgled in a
disjunctive “or” statement)), rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016).
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those of the generic offense.”117 Next, the Court somewhat mischaracterized
this issue in the case as whether the Act “makes an exception to that rule
when a defendant is convicted under a statute that lists multiple, alternative
means of satisfying one (or more) of its elements.”118 Contrary to the issue
the Court presented, however, the real issue that the courts of appeals faced
was determining what indeed qualified as an element and what qualified as
a mean. The lower courts did not contest the elements-based categorical
approach, but were confused as to its application given the second footnote
in Descamps.119
As discussed above,120 the defendant in Mathis had been found guilty of
being a felon in possession of a firearm and had a criminal history that
included five separate second-degree burglary convictions in Iowa.121 The
Iowa second-degree burglary statute punished the burgling of an “occupied
structure,”122 which was elsewhere defined as “any building, structure,
appurtenances to buildings and structures, land, water or air vehicle, or
similar place adapted for overnight accommodation of persons, or occupied
by persons for the purpose of carrying on business or other activity therein,
or for the storage or safekeeping of anything of value.”123 While this looked
much like the statutes at issue in Taylor and Shepard and discussed in
Descamps’s dicta, the Court ultimately disagreed, holding that this laundry
list of places that can be burgled were not separate elements, but merely
separate means.124
The Court held that the elements of a crime are the pieces that a jury
must agree upon beyond a reasonable doubt to return a conviction.125 Thus,
for a jury to convict an Iowan defendant of burglary, they need only agree
that the person burgled an occupied structure.126 They need not agree
whether the structure was a boat, or a house, or an amalgam of the two; as
long as the jurors all agree the place that was burgled was an “occupied
117. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2247.
118. Id. at 2248.
119. Id. at 2248–49; see also Mathis, 786 F.3d at 1074–75 (citing Descamps v. United
States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2285 n.2) (2013); Prater, 766 F.3d at 510; Rendon, 764 F.3d at
1085.
120. See supra notes 1–13 and accompanying text.
121. Mathis, 786 F.3d at 1070.
122. IOWA CODE §§ 713.1, 713.5 (2017).
123. Id. § 702.12.
124. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256.
125. Id. at 2248.
126. State v. Rooney, 862 N.W.2d 367, 376 (Iowa 2015) (discussing the single “broadly
phrased . . . element of place” in Iowa’s burglary law).
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structure,” they could convict the defendant. Therefore, the laundry list of
different places capable of being burgled in the Iowa burglary statute,
according to Iowa law, were not elements but were merely different means
of fulfilling the “occupied structure” element.
Applying this rule to the case at hand, the Court found that the
defendant’s five burglaries in Iowa—which were indeed burglaries of
structures—did not qualify as ACCA predicates because the Iowa burglary
statute was not divisible; instead, the statute had only one set of elements
which criminalized conduct that was broader than generic burglary. As a
result, the Court held that the lower court’s use of the modified categorical
approach on an indivisible statute was inappropriate and overturned the
defendant’s ACCA sentence.127
The ACCA has taken many twists and turns in its thirty-year history.
Originally intended to broadly punish habitual offenders, the Court has
continually narrowed its application through the legal technicalities of the
categorical approach. The ACCA’s own chief architect, Senator Specter,
expressed his dissatisfaction that recent Supreme Court cases had “severely
limited [the Act’s] reach” by narrowly interpreting what was meant to be a
broad application of the term “violent crime.”128 This narrowing has created
a number of problems that continue to persist and must be remedied to steer
the ACCA back onto the course for which it was intended.
III. Thematic Problems of the Categorical Approach
Needless to say, the Court’s categorical approach has created a host of
inconsistencies. The legal fiction required by the categorical approach—
punishing habitual offenders according to the statutory elements of their
previous convictions rather than the offender’s criminal conduct—reached a
boiling point in Mathis and justified years of judges’ and academic
commentators’ concerns that the categorical approach cannot be sustained
from either a pragmatic or ideological standpoint.129 It should come as no
surprise that when the Court tries to spin legal fiction based on truth, its

127. Id. at 2257.
128. Kupfer, supra note 24, at 165 n.85 (quoting 156 CONG. REC. S10, 516–17 (daily ed.
Dec. 17, 2010)).
129. See Evan Tsen Lee, Mathis v. U.S. and the Future of the Categorical Approach, 101
MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 263, 265 (2016), http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/11/Lee-1.pdf (stating that the concurrences and dissents in Mathis
addressed “two leading normative arguments for abolishing the categorical approach, one
pragmatic and the other ideological”).
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ever-branching webs of doctrine would eventually become tangled in
themselves.
A. The Categorical Approach Produces Bizarre and Unintended Results
Again and again, lower courts have lodged their grievances against the
categorical approach, believing that it fosters “an air of make-believe”130
and even going as far as saying that it “produces nonsensical results.” 131
Judge Hand may have captured the problem best when commenting on a
similar categorical approach in the immigration context, stating that when
judges “may not consider the particular conduct for which the [criminal]
has been convicted,” criminals who have committed serious offenses may
avoid the intended punishment.132
Judge Hand’s timeless realization rings true even today because the
categorical approach continues to narrow the ACCA to the point that the
very type of habitual offenders meant to be captured by the Act escape its
punishment due to legal technicalities. In Taylor, the Court overturned the
ACCA sentence of a criminal with a long criminal history that included
robbery, assault, and two second-degree burglaries.133 In Shepard, the Court
overturned the ACCA sentence of a criminal who had “dozens of prior state
convictions, including eleven for breaking and entering.”134 In Descamps,
the Court overturned the ACCA sentence of a criminal who had “five
previous felony convictions,” which included “robbery, burglary, and
felony harassment.”135 In Mathis, the Court overturned the ACCA sentence
of a criminal who had “five [previous] burglary convictions” in addition to
a previous conviction for “interference with official acts inflicting serious
injury.”136 Thus, not only does the categorical approach go “against the
grain” of our common-sense understanding of criminal justice,137 but it also
contravenes Congress’s intent to incapacitate habitual offenders.138
130. United States v. Shepard, 348 F.3d 308, 311 (1st Cir. 2003), rev’d, 544 U.S. 16
(2005).
131. United States v. Martinez-Cortez, 988 F.2d 1408, 1418 (5th Cir. 1993) (Jolly, J.,
concurring).
132. United States ex rel. Guarino v. Uhl, 107 F.2d 399, 400 (2d Cir. 1939).
133. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 577 (1990).
134. Shepard, 348 F.3d at 309.
135. United States v. Descamps, 466 Fed. Appx. 563, 564 (9th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 133
S. Ct. 2276 (2013).
136. United States v. Mathis, 786 F.3d 1068, 1071, rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016).
137. Lee, supra note 21, at 23.
138. See Norah M. Roth, Comment, It’s Not Rape-Rape: Statutory Rape Classification
Under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 85 ST. JOHN L. REV. 1653, 1668 (2014) (“It is . . .
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Congress made clear at every step of the way that the ACCA was
designed to thwart repeat offenders in order to protect society against the
disproportionate amount of crime they commit.139 The Court began to
realize that its doctrine was veering off this path as early as Shepard, in
which dissenting members of the Court criticized the categorical approach
by stating that the majority’s ruling made “little sense as a practical matter,
and . . . will substantially frustrate Congress’s scheme for punishing repeat
violent offenders who violate federal gun laws.”140 This criticism was
joined by many lower courts, which characterized the categorical approach
as “counterfactual and counterintuitive because it [forbade] adjudicators
from weighing factual allegations.”141
In Descamps, Justice Kagan herself, the eventual author of the majority
decision, stated during oral argument that finding for the criminal offender
would be “a little bit insane.”142 During the same oral argument, Justice
Breyer noted that many criminals who committed violent crimes will
escape their intended ACCA sentence based on a technicality of legal
fiction.143 Justice Kennedy noted in his concurrence that the Court’s
decision would disqualify “an unspecified number . . . of state criminal
statutes that[, similar to California,] are indivisible but that often do reach
serious crimes otherwise subject to the ACCA’s provisions.”144 Justice
apparent that strict application of the law as it has evolved may not always serve the
purposes of the ACCA.”).
139. See S. REP. NO. 98-190, 98th Cong. at 7 (1984); see also 134 CONG. REC. S88493
(daily ed. June 23, 1988) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter).
140. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 28 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
141. See Koh, supra note 19, at 1834 n.185 (citing Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S.
133, 151 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting)) (criticizing possible “untoward consequences” of the
categorical approach under the Armed Career Criminal Act); Tijani v. Holder, 628 F.3d
1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2010) (acknowledging the categorical approach’s “[c]ounterfactual and
counterintuitive” nature); Latu v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2008)
(O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (critiquing the majority’s “counter-intuitive holding” that a hitand-run statute does not involve a crime involving moral turpitude); Mary Holper, The New
Moral Turpitude Test: Failing Chevron Step Zero, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1241, 1301 (2011)
(“Some courts have questioned the [categorical] approach as unduly formulaic, as [it]
requires the immigration judge to put on blinders as to what ‘really happened.’” (citing
Montero- Ubri v. INS, 229 F.3d 319, 321 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Miller, 478 F.3d
48, 52 (1st Cir. 2007))).
142. Mark Middaugh, Comment, Debriefing Descamps: A Comment on Burglary and the
Armed Career Criminal Act, 67 STAN. L. REV. 723, 729 (2015) (quoting Transcript of Oral
Argument at 21, Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (No. 11-9540)).
143. Id. (citing Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 142, at 11).
144. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2293–94 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Further scholarship
picked up where Justice Kennedy left off and confirmed that six states—Arizona, California,
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Breyer voiced a similar concern in his dissent in Mathis, finding that the
Court’s decision would disqualify several other state burglary statutes that
were fashioned similarly to the Iowa statute at issue from ever serving as
ACCA predicates.145 Finally, Justice Alito took a slightly different tack
when dissenting to the Mathis decision, lamenting that the Court’s journey
over the past twenty-five years had gone woefully off course.146 Doubling
down on his dissent in Descamps,147 Justice Alito decried the Court’s
jurisprudence as a path “that has increasingly led to results that Congress
could not have intended.”148
These unintended consequences, which see habitual offenders escaping
punishment under the ACCA, are a result of the contrived categorical
approach. The bizarre results that it produces are hard to grasp partially
because the doctrine is not based in reality, but rather relies on the legal
fiction that crimes are actually comprised of a set of elements, as opposed
to the underlying criminal conduct. Thus, this competition between
elements and means continues to be one of the most fundamental issues
plaguing the ACCA.
B. In the Elements vs. Means Debate, Everybody Loses
“[T]he dichotomy between divisible and indivisible state
criminal statutes is not all that clear.”
‒ Justice Kennedy, concurring, Descamps v.
United States
Idaho, Illinois, Nevada, and Rhode Island—had burglary statutes similar to California, thus
disqualifying burglaries in these states as qualifying as ACCA predicates. See Middaugh,
supra note 142, at 727-28 n.30-35.
145. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2263–64 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing COLO. REV. STAT. §§
18–4–101, 18–4–202, 18–4–203 (2015); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45–2–101, 45–6–201, 45–6–
204 (2015); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 635:1 (2015); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 12.1–22–02,
12.1–22–06 (West 2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2909.01, 2911.11–2911.13 (LexisNexis
2014); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3501, 3502 (West 2015); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS §§ 22–1–2, 22–32–1, 22–32–3, 22–32–8 (2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 6–1–104, 6–3–
301 (2015); MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 221.0, 221.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1980)); see also id. at
2268 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court arrives at today’s decision, the upshot of which is
that all burglary convictions in a great many States may be disqualified from counting as
predicate offenses under ACCA.”).
146. Id. at 2266–67 (Alito, J., dissenting) (likening the Court’s doctrine to a woman’s
real life two-day journey that took her hundreds of miles off course because of her blind trust
in a malfunctioning GPS device).
147. See Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2295–2303 (Alito, J., dissenting).
148. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2268 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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From the beginning, Congress sought to fashion the ACCA to prevent
“the possibility that culpable offenders might escape punishment on a
technicality” based on the “wide variation among states and localities.”149
Congress failed, and the Court exacerbated the problem by ensuring that a
single technicality would indeed let a large number of habitual offenders off
the hook. As mentioned above, the elements-means dichotomy highlighted
in Descamps and Mathis has successfully disqualified the burglary statutes
of several states based on the legal fiction that these state burglary statutes
do not adequately conform to the generic definition of burglary. Further,
while the Court in Mathis claimed it was preventing “inconsistency and
arbitrariness” from polluting its past ACCA precedent,150 the decision
succeeded in doing the opposite by calling Taylor and Shepard—both
dealing with similar burglary statutes to the one at issue in Mathis— into
question.
The root of this inconsistency is found in Taylor itself and the Court’s
original conception of the modified categorical approach. Taylor stated that
a burglary statute that criminalized “entry of an automobile as well as a
building” was divisible because it presented alternative elements and
instructed that sentencing courts use the modified categorical approach.151
This instruction in Taylor, however, was complicated by future decisions
in Schad v. Arizona152 and Richardson v. United States,153 which established
a different definition of the term “elements.” Schad touched on the
elements-means distinction, holding that “[a]lthough a defendant is entitled
to a unanimous jury verdict on whether the criminal act charged has been
committed, the defendant is not entitled to a unanimous verdict on the
precise manner in which the act was committed.”154 Schad also recognized
that while state legislatures “frequently enumerate alternative means of
committing a crime without intending to define separate elements or
separate crimes,”155 the jury need only return a unanimous verdict on each
element of the charged crime.156
Richardson further clarified that “a jury in a federal criminal case cannot
convict unless it unanimously finds that the Government has proved each
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

S. REP. NO. 98-190, at 20 (2013).
Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2257.
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (2013).
501 U.S. 624 (1991).
526 U.S. 813 (1999).
Schad, 501 U.S. at 629, 648 (citation omitted).
Id. at 636.
Richardson, 526 U.S. at 817.
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element.”157 Thus, Richardson affirmed Schad, and offered an example of a
robbery statute in which “an element of robbery is force or the threat of
force.”158 As the example goes, some jurors might disagree whether
the defendant used a knife to create the threat; others might
conclude he used a gun. But that disagreement—a disagreement
about means—would not matter as long as all 12 jurors
unanimously concluded that the Government had proved the
necessary related element, namely, that the defendant had
threatened force.159
This delineation between elements—the essential features of a crime that
the jury must unanimously agree upon to convict the defendant—and
means—the underlying brute facts that make up a particular element—was
so clear, even the dissent stood on “common ground” in regards to these
definitions.160
Unfortunately, when the Court picked up the ACCA issue again in
Shepard, decided after both Schad and Richardson, it did not correct or
update the elements-means doctrine previously espoused in Taylor. Instead,
the Court doubled down on this stale precedent. In Shepard, which dealt
with a statute that criminalized the burgling of multiple places such as
buildings and automobiles, the Court found that the “divisible nature of the
Massachusetts burglary statute” at issue “authorized sentencing courts to
scrutinize a restricted set of materials” by implementing the modified
categorical approach.161 This definition did little to clarify the elementsmeans distinction; nevertheless, the Court found that the modified
categorical approach—which can only be used when a state statute presents
an alternative set of elements—was appropriate to use for Massachusetts’s
burglary statute. In Descamps, the Court confounded the problem yet again
by offering an example that misused the term “elements”:

157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See id. at 828 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“We begin on common ground, for, as the
Court acknowledges, it is settled that jurors need not agree on all of the means the accused
used to commit an offense.”).
161. Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2284 (2013) (describing the Court’s
analysis in Shepard); see also Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 35 (2009) (characterizing
the burglary statute at issue in Shepard, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266 § 16, as being subject to
the modified categorical approach).
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[A]ssume . . . that a statute criminalizes assault with any of eight
specified weapons; and suppose further . . . that only assault with
a gun counts as an ACCA offense. A later sentencing court need
only [use the modified categorical approach to] check the
charging documents and instructions . . . to determine whether in
convicting a defendant under that divisible statute, the jury
necessarily found that he committed the ACCA-qualifying
crime.162
Justice Alito put his finger on the issue when he argued that the definition
of the term “elements” in Richardson is incompatible with the Court’s use
of the term in Taylor and Shepard.163 Whereas the Court sought to adopt an
elements-based approach, the examples given in Taylor, Shepard, and
Descamps were not “elements” at all; rather, the Court was playing fast and
loose with the precise legal definition of the term “elements” and had
mistakenly listed different means.164 Thus, Alito came to the logical
conclusion that the Court must have meant something different than
“elements” when discussing divisibility in the context of its examples in
Taylor, Shepard, and Descamps.165
In other words, the Court confirmed in Taylor and Shepard that statutes
listing alternative places that can be burgled were divisible and listed
alternative elements. Descamps also used an example stating that a
hypothetical assault statute that listed alternative weapons was also
divisible, concluding that it listed alternative elements.166 Thus, Mathis
went against this string of precedent when it stated for the first time that a
statute was not divisible and did not list alternative elements when listing
places that could be burgled. The dissent was right to express its disbelief in
such a circumstance.
The striking similarities between Taylor and Mathis were not lost on
Justice Breyer: Taylor also involved a defendant convicted under a state’s
seemingly overbroad second-degree burglary statute that included places
like tents, booths, and railroad cars in its definition of places that could be
burgled.167 In Taylor, the Court held that in such situations, the modified
categorical approach could be utilized “to determine what the state

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2290 (emphasis added).
Id. at 2295-96 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2296.
Id. at 2297–98.
See id. at 2290 (majority opinion).
Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2260 (2016) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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conviction was actually for: building, tent, or railroad car.”168 Yet in
Mathis, after twenty-five years of muddling, the majority came to the
opposite conclusion and defined these things as means, holding that the
modified categorical approach was now inappropriate for such statutes.169
Justice Alito, in a separate dissent, stated that the practical application of
the elements vs. means test should have served as a “warning bell” that
suggested the Court had “made a wrong turn at some point.”170 Justice
Alito’s conclusion was clear: the Court should endeavor to fix the troubled
doctrine by amending the categorical and modified categorical approach to
allow “a sentencing court to take a look at the record in the earlier case to
see if the place that was burglarized was a building or something else. If the
record is lost or inconclusive, the court could refuse to count the
conviction.”171 Even Justice Kennedy, who had joined the dissent in
Shepard172 and issued a cautious concurrence in Descamps,173 found
himself candidly wondering if the Court needed to take a new course to fix
the current ACCA doctrine that seemed so contrary to its intent.174
The enduring elements vs. means issue is largely the root cause of many
of the ACCA’s problems. Comparing elements of predicate crimes to the
federal generic version of the crime not only taxes judicial economy
because of the difficult application of the rule, but also requires federal
judges to rely on state law, which produces inconsistent results due to the
various differences in the criminal codes of the fifty states.
C. Uniformity and Fairness Suffers when Federal Punishment Is Based
Upon the Inconsistencies Between States’ Laws
“[A]bsent plain indication to the contrary, federal laws are not to
be construed so that their application is dependent on state law.”
-- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575,
591 (1990).

168. Id.
169. Id. at 2257 (majority opinion).
170. Id. at 2268 (Alito, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 2269–70; see also Lee, supra note 129, at 269 (proposing a new rule that “in
any case where it is ambiguous which portion of a statute generated the conviction in
question, the conviction simply does not qualify”).
172. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 28 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
173. Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2293 (2013) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
174. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2258 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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The categorical approach also manages to contravene legislative intent
by ushering in a federal sentencing doctrine that is unevenly applied based
upon the various differences between states’ criminal codes. The legislative
history clearly shows that Congress sought to create a sentencing
enhancement that would punish habitual offenders equally, regardless of the
jurisdiction in which they committed their predicate offenses. Instead, after
a quarter-century of muddling, the Court in Mathis did exactly what
Taylor175 and Descamps176 had warned against: it “parse[d] state law”177
and relied upon the differing definitions and precedents of the Iowa courts
to determine the application of a federal sentencing enhancement.
Once again, the root of this inconsistency can be traced back to Taylor,
which presented a unique problem that the Court purported to solve, albeit
through contradiction. While the Court acknowledged congressional intent
to treat similar habitual offenders similarly based on “fundamental
fairness,”178 it nevertheless instituted an elements-based categorical
approach which required the consideration of state burglary statutes. As the
Court itself has admitted, substantial variation exists among the states’
criminal codes because state supreme courts, not federal courts, have
“substantial leeway in deciding what facts shall be essential elements of a
statutory offense”179 and “are the ultimate expositors of state law.”180 Thus,
in one inconsistent opinion, Congress’s ultimate intent was thrown to the
wayside and state law has since been considered in the application of the
ACCA.181
Ever since Taylor, state law has played a major role in applying the
ACCA. In other words, the ACCA’s application largely depends on how a
state defines burglary and whether these state-law elements comported with
the generic definition of burglary. Descamps doubled down on this logic to
the derision of the dissent, which stated that “[t]he Court’s holding will
hamper the achievement of [Congress’s] objectives by artificially limiting
175. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 475, 590–91 (1990).
176. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2285 n.2.
177. Id.
178. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 581–82.
179. Lee, supra note 21, at 64 (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977)
(noting that states have discretion to allocate essential elements in relation to affirmative
defenses)); cf. McMillian v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (discussing how the
applicability of the reasonable-doubt standard is generally dependent on how state defines
the offense in terms of essential elements).
180. Lee, supra note 21, at 64 (citing Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.)
590 (1874); R.R. Comm’n of Texas v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941)).
181. See supra notes 44–49 and accompanying text.
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[the] ACCA’s reach and treating similar convictions differently based
solely on the vagaries of state law.”182 In Mathis, the Court’s disregard for
federal uniformity reached its height, disregarding Taylor and Descamps by
directly relying on a state supreme court case to apply federal law.183 Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence succinctly captured the problem in noting the “vast
sentencing disparities for defendants convicted of identical criminal
conduct in different jurisdictions.”184
As the Court has recognized in other contexts, “[b]ecause the application
of federal legislation is nationwide . . . the federal program would be
impaired if state law were to control.”185 These inconsistencies are not
merely problematic because they contravene congressional intent; they also
produce disproportionate sentences,186 result in false positives in which
non-violent non-habitual defendants are sentenced as “career criminals,”187
and even reduce the deterrent effect of the ACCA.188
Trying to come to grips with this inherent inconsistency, courts have in
vain attempted to explain this reliance on state law by arguing that
Congress was aware that such inconsistencies would arise but nevertheless
forged ahead with the ACCA because federalism concerns outweighed
these inconsistencies.189 This logic, however, completely ignores actual
congressional intent and basic tenets of federal interpretation of nationwide

182. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2302 (Alito, J., dissenting).
183. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2257 (2016).
184. Id. at 2258 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
185. Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 119–120 (1983).
186. See Lamprecht, supra note 27, at 1408 (citing Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 19
(2003) (affirming a sentence of twenty-five-years-to-life imprisonment for theft of golf
clubs)).
187. Id. (citing United States v. Sperberg, 432 F.3d 706 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding
defendant to have a criminal “career” consisting of theft of lobster tails from a grocery store,
verbal threat to a security guard, and convictions for drunk driving); see also Beverly G.
Dyer, Revising Criminal History: Model Sentencing Guidelines §§ 4.1-4.2, 18 FED. SENT’G
REP. 373, 376 (2006) (“[ACCA] has been used to sweep in far too many crimes that present
a relatively remote risk of the use of physical force or physical injury.”).
188. See Lamprecht, supra note 27, at 1408 (citing Stephen R. Sady, ACCA Lessons: The
Armed Career Criminal Act-What's Wrong with “Three Strikes, You’re Out”?, 7 FED.
SENT’G REP. 69, 70 (1994) (“The [ACCA] can strike like a lightning bolt, rather than serve
as a rational deterrent.”)).
189. See United States v. Duval, 496 F.3d 64, 83 (1st Cir. 2007) (“Congress implicitly
accepted such inconsistencies in the application of the ACCA because it was concerned
about federalism and wanted to preserve the state’s role in defining, enforcing, and
prosecuting essentially local crimes . . . .”).
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statutory schemes, which provide uniformity in the midst of the different
laws of the states and territories.190
Allowing states dispositive influence over federal sentencing contravenes
the intent of Congress and conflicts with basic notions of fairness and
justice. Instead of punishing like offenders and offenses alike, habitual
offenders under the ACCA can be punished differently based on where they
grew up and where they committed their first crimes. The Court must
address these problems and must start the difficult job of extricating ACCA
doctrine from the deep, Court-created hole in which it currently sits.
IV. Solving the Federal Problem with an Analysis of Approaches
Taken by the States
The shortcomings of the categorical approach are legion, and many
judicial and academic commentators have not only suggested a change in
course,191 but also have devised various methods to fix the failing
doctrine.192 This Article proposes a simple yet novel solution to fix the
ACCA’s problems: consider how the states deal with the same problem in
their habitual-offender statutes. This may seem like an odd solution given
that the previous section highlighted the problem of relying on state law,
but this proposed solution is actually quite different in kind. Whereas the
current ACCA doctrine is applied differently based on the state in which the
defendant committed a predicate offense, this Article instead seeks to learn
from how states apply their own habitual-offender laws uniformly when
they encounter criminals who have committed predicate offenses in other
jurisdictions. By learning from these states, the Court can employ one
uniform application that is immune to the faults of the categorical approach.
Habitual-offender statutes exist in almost all fifty states,193 which have
been applying these criminal statutes since colonial times.194 The states’
190. See Lamprecht, supra note 27, at 1430 n.124 (“One of the rationales for ACCA-type
sanctions was the alleviation of the difficulties ‘encountered by Federal courts in applying
State robbery and burglary laws in Federal prosecutions.’” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 98-1073, at
5 (1984)).
191. See Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2258 (2016) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); id. at 2262 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Lee, supra note 129, at 269.
192. Some commentators have suggested having a comprehensive list of all state crimes
that qualify as “violent felonies” under the ACCA to clear up any potential confusion. See,
e.g., Kupfer, supra note 24, at 154-55; Lee, supra note 21, at 7; Hayley A. Montgomery,
Comment, Remedying the Armed Career Criminal Act’s Ailing Residual Provision, 33
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 715, 736 (2010).
193. See Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 26 (1992).
194. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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habitual-offender statutes come in all shapes and sizes, punish for different
conduct, and impose different penalties for repeat offenders. One of the few
things that the state laws have in common with the ACCA, however, is that
they seek to punish repeat offenders who are a harm to society by counting
felony convictions from other states toward the habitual-offender statutes’
required number of predicate offenses.195 One might even argue that the
ACCA was inspired by these state laws, many of which were on the books
long before the 1980s. Thus, in an era of cooperative federalism, ACCA
doctrine has much to gain by considering different state approaches to
determining whether felonies committed in other jurisdictions qualify as
predicate offenses.
The federal government and the states have a long history of fashioning
laws after one another. States fashion laws after successful federal
statutes,196 and the federal government has been known to do the same
when vanguard states provide useful models that could further federal
policy.197 In other controversial public policy initiatives, the federal

195. The only exception may be Arkansas’ habitual-offender statute, but there is split
authority on this issue. An Eighth Circuit case, Prichard v. Lockhart, 990 F.2d 352 (8th Cir.
1993), suggests that Arkansas’s habitual-offender statute may not count out-of-state
convictions as predicates. “Under the plain language of [ARK. CODE ANN. §] 5-64-401(c), a
defendant’s previous out-of-state conviction is not a violation of ‘this subsection’ of the
statute and therefore could not be used to increase Prichard’s offense level under the
statute.” Id. at 354. But, the Arkansas Supreme Court’s own interpretation has included outof-state convictions under its habitual offender laws. See Green v. State, 852 S.W.2d
110,113 (Ark. Ct. App. 1993) (finding that convictions from other states can be used to
increase sentences under habitual-offender laws); McGirt v. State, 708 S.W.2d 620, 622
(Ark. 1986) (finding similarly to Green).
196. See, e.g., Mendoza v. Town of Ross, 27 Cal. Rptr. 3d 352, 459 (Ct. App. 2005)
(relying on federal law interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in order to
interpret California’s own Fair Employment and Housing Act because “the
antidiscrimination objectives and relevant wording of title VII . . . [and other federal
antidiscrimination statutes] are similar to those of the FEHA”).
197. See, e.g., 140 CONG. REC. No. 1905 (1994) (statement of Rep. Myron Kreideler)
(“I’m glad we are enacting in Federal law the principle Washington State voters approved
last year by a 3 to 1 majority: Anyone who commits three violent felonies, anywhere, gets
locked up for good.”); Nick Glass, Romney: Without Romneycare, No Obamacare, POLITICO
(Oct. 23, 2015, 3:13 P.M.), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/10/mitt-romneyromneycare-obamacare-boston-globe-215112 (detailing how former Massachusetts
Governor Mitt Romney’s state-based medical coverage plan paved the way for the larger
federal health coverage plan).
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government has taken a conservative wait-and-see approach, content to
study the results from state experiments.198
Federal courts have also relied upon state court interpretations to assist
deciphering complex federal legislative schemes. For example, when
defining what constituted “elements” in Richardson, the Court was
informed by various state laws that did not require juror unanimity on
underlying criminal acts.199 The dissent too relied upon state court
precedent to argue for a certain interpretation, since these state criminal
statutes “provide an analog” to the federal statute at issue in that case.200 In
Nijhawan v. Holder,201 the Court conducted what amounted to a nearly
fifty-state survey to inform its interpretation of a federal criminal
sentencing statute.202 The Court subsequently based its interpretation of the

198. See, e.g., Beau Kilmer, The Legal Marijuana Middle Ground: Column, USA TODAY
(Nov. 30, 2016, 6:00 A.M.), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2016/11/30/
marijuana-legalize-states-medical-recreational-column/94553192/ (recognizing that “[s]tates
are the laboratories of democracy, so let them experiment” and postulating on different
models that would allow the federal government to legalize the states’ regulation of
marijuana).
199. Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 821 (1999) (ultimately disagreeing with
state statutes, in part, because jury unanimity was not a constitutional requirement in these
states) (citing People v. Gear, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 261, 263–66 (Ct. App. 1993) (regarding crime
for continuous sexual abuse of a child); People v. Reynolds, 689 N.E. 2d 375, 343-44 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1997) (regarding criminal sexual assault of a minor and aggravated sexual abuse of
a minor); State v. Spigarolo, 556 A.2d 112, 127-29 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989) (regarding crime
for committing an act likely to impair the health or morals of a child); Soper v. State, 731
P.2d 587, 592 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987) (regarding crime for sexual assault in the first
degree)).
200. Id. at 833 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing People v. Adames, 62 Cal Rptr. 2d 631
(Ct. App. 1997) (regarding crime of continuous sexual abuse of a child)); People v.
Reynolds, 689 N.E. 2d 335 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (regarding criminal sexual assault and
aggravated sexual abuse of a minor); State v. Molitor, 565 N.W. 2d 248 (Wis. Ct. App.
1997) (regarding crime of repeated sexual intercourse with underage partner); State v.
Doogan, 917 P.2d 155 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (regarding crime of advancing prostitution and
profiting from prostitution)).
201. 557 U.S. 29 (2009).
202. Id. at 40. Attempting to interpret Congress’s intent regarding the monetary threshold
for certain acts of fraud and deceit, the Court found that
29 States had no major fraud or deceit statute with any relevant monetary
threshold. In 13 of the remaining 21 States, fraud and deceit statutes contain
relevant monetary thresholds but with amounts significantly higher than
$10,000, leaving only 8 States with statutes in respect to which subparagraph
(M)(i)'s $10,000 threshold, as categorically interpreted, would have full effect.
Id.
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federal statute on its findings from the states.203 Taylor itself, the root of the
problem, attempted to rely on state laws to employ one uniform definition
for generic burglary. The Court reasoned that what “Congress meant by
‘burglary’” in the ACCA was “the generic sense in which the term is now
used in the criminal codes of most States.”204 Thus, this methodology—
which asks federal courts to glean from the wisdom of state courts that
address similar problems—has many sources of precedent.
Among the many types of different state habitual-offender statutes this
Article considers, “three strikes” laws are particularly interesting.205 While
the state and federal versions of the three strikes law vary in significant
ways from the ACCA,206 there are similarities in both intent and
203. Id. (“We do not believe Congress would have intended (M)(i) to apply in so limited
and so haphazard a manner.”); see also United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 427–28
(2009). In Hayes the Court undertook a similar state survey to interpret a federal domestic
violence statute, finding that
only about one-third of the States had criminal statutes that specifically
proscribed domestic violence. . . . Given the paucity of state and federal statutes
targeting domestic violence, we find it highly improbable that Congress meant
to extend § 922(g)(9)’s firearm possession ban only to the relatively few
domestic abusers prosecuted under laws rendering a domestic relationship an
element of the offense.
Id.
204. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990) (citing Perrin v. United States,
444 U.S. 37, 45 (1979) (using state law to define the bounds for the undefined term
“bribery” in 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1976)); United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 289 (1969)
(using state law to define the bounds of the undefined term “extortion” in 18 U.S.C. § 1952)
(1976)).
205. This Article does not take a position on the efficacy of three strikes laws, which has
been explored in great depth by criminologist scholars and practitioners. Compare Walter L.
Gordon III, California’s Three Strikes Law: Tyranny of the Majority, 20 WHITTIER L. REV.
577, 580 (1999) (arguing that empirical data shows that California’s Three Strikes law has
been ineffective because the decline in crime after passage of these laws corresponds with an
already declining crime rate), with Bill Jones, Why the Three Strikes Law Is Working in
California, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 23 (1999) (arguing that the empirical data on the
California Three Strikes law shows that it is working by lowering the crime rate). Rather,
three strikes laws are merely one source to which the federal courts can look to find a
uniform rule to ensure that habitual offenders are punished equally regardless of which
jurisdiction they committed their predicate criminal acts.
It is outside the scope of this Article to comment on the moral or philosophical
strengths and weaknesses of mandatory minimum life sentences, or even the efficacy of
these sentencing schemes. Instead, this Article focuses on statutory interpretation and
practical application of the ACCA and other statute habitual-offender statutes.
206. For example, three strikes laws often require mandatory life imprisonment upon
conviction of a serious felony, usually one that includes violence. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
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draftsmanship that make a comparison relevant. Both, for example, are
recidivist statutes premised on the public policy that a small number of
criminals commit a stunning amount of the crime in society.207 Both are
triggered when the defendant has committed a certain number of qualifying
crimes.208 Most importantly, both consider qualifying crimes from other
sovereigns as predicates to enhanced sentences.209 Thus, it can be argued
that the “terms and penalties of the ACCA” served as “a prelude to the
increasingly popular ‘three strikes’ legislation”210 that swept the country in
the mid-1990s. It could even be argued that the straightforward drafting of
the federal three strikes statute—the statutory language of which has never
required Supreme Court interpretation211—was a result of Congress’s hardlearned lessons from the draftsmanship failure of the ACCA nearly a
decade before.212
§ 3559(c) (2012). See generally Thomas W. Hillier, Comparing Three Strikes and the
ACCA—Lessons to Learn, 7 FED. SENT’G REP. 78 (1995). In addition, due to the potential
punishment, most three strikes laws drastically limit the number and types of crimes that can
count as “strikes.” Id.
207. See supra note 30 and accompanying text; 140 CONG. REC. No. 34 (1994),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-1994-03-23/html/CREC-1994-03-23-pt1-PgH36.htm
(statement of Rep. Myron Kreidler) (expressing his happiness that Congress was adopting a
federal “three strikes” provision through the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994 because “[t]hat’s how to protect society from the small group of criminals who
do the most harm, over and over again.”); Ilene M. Shinbein, Comment, “Three-Strikes and
You’re Out”: A Good Political Slogan to Reduce Crime, but a Failure in Its Application, 22
NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 175, 189 (1996) (“Senator Trent Lott, sponsor
of the federal crime bill, noted in support of the ‘three-strikes’ measure that only 6 percent of
all violent offenders commit 70 percent of all violent crimes and that 76 percent of those
with three or more incarcerations tend to commit crimes again when they get out of
prison.”).
208. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2012), with 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1)(A) (2012), and
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(A) (2012).
209. Compare 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(e)(2)(A)(ii), (e)(2)(B), with 18 U.S.C. §§ 3559(c)(1)(A),
(c)(2), and CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(a)(1).
210. See Hillier, supra note 206, at 78.
211. Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619, 1640 (2016) (recognizing that the Court has never
“construed the [Three Strikes federal] statute”).
212. The ACCA was originally passed in 1984. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–473, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 924 (e) (2012)). The
three strikes laws were passed all within a few years of each other starting with Washington
in 1993, and ending with Indiana in 1996. See Ronald F. Wright, Three Strikes Legislation
and Sentencing Commission Objectives, 20 LAW & POL’Y 429, 444–47 tbl. 2 (1998) (listing
all jurisdictions that enacted three strikes laws and their dates of passage); see also Nolan E.
Jones, Three Strikes and You’re Out: A Symbolic Crime Policy?, in CRIME CONTROL AND
SOCIAL JUSTICE: THE DELICATE BALANCE 53, 56 (Darnell F. Hawkins et al. eds., Greenwood
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By studying and categorizing the way that states deal with the problem
of applying their own habitual-offender laws to criminals who have
committed offenses in other jurisdictions, the federal courts stand to learn
and, as a result, may be able to fashion an appropriate substitute for the
failing categorical approach.
V. When in Rhode Island: Analysis of State Approaches
to Predicate Crimes
The states have taken several different approaches to determining which
prior crimes should count toward sentencing a criminal as a habitual
offender. These variations stem from the fact that each state enjoys
sovereignty to dictate its own system of criminal laws and procedures, as
long as these laws do not violate the federal Constitution.213 While these
variations differ as to form, structure, and even what crimes can serve as
predicates,214 there are still many common lessons that the federal courts
can glean.
A. Developing an Exhaustive List of Predicate Offenses
Like the ACCA, most states specifically list crimes, or classes of crimes,
that qualify as predicates for habitual-offender sentencing enhancement.
The states have taken the time, however, to specify and define these
enumerated crimes to ensure minimal judicial confusion when applied.
For example, states like Alabama categorize crimes in terms of their
level of offense.215 Alabama determines predicate offenses and the habitualsentencing enhancements they garner based on Class A, B, and C felonies.
Thus, in Alabama, when a habitual offender is convicted of a Class A
felony, but already has, say, a Class C felony on his or her record, “he or
she must be punished by imprisonment for life or for any term of not more
than 99 years but not less than 15 years.”216 The punishments range on a
sliding scale based on the class of the current conviction and the class of the
Press 2003) (“Between 1993 and 1995, some twenty-four states and the federal government
enacted laws around the style of ‘three strikes.’”).
213. See supra notes 179–180 and accompanying text.
214. See, e.g., Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody, The Lethal Effects of ThreeStrikes Laws, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 89, 101–02 (2001) (highlighting the differences between
the three strikes laws in California, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, North Dakota, South
Carolina, Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Nevada, North Carolina, Vermont, and
Utah).
215. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-9 (2015).
216. Id. § 13A-5-9 (a)(3).
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previous conviction(s), with Class A being the most serious and Class C
being the least serious.217 Other states, such as New Jersey and Hawaii, also
take a similar approach.218
Just under half the states are even more specific and list distinct felony
crimes that serve as predicates; these habitual-offender statutes also crossreference the definitions of these enumerated crimes by citing the
definitions from states’ respective criminal codes. Montana, for example,
lists crimes such as homicide, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault,
robbery, and sex crimes in its three strikes statute, all while citing the
criminal code statute that defines these crimes.219 Such an approach cuts
down on any potential confusion as to which crimes the habitual-offender
statute refers. Under such an approach, a sentencing judge would need only
look to an offender’s prior criminal record to see if any of his or her prior
crimes matched with the exhaustive list of predicate offenses outlined in the
statute.220
The advantages of this approach are obvious—federal judges would be
relieved of the confusing task of determining divisibility and parsing state
law, and would instead need only refer to an exhaustive list of predicate
state law offenses qualifying as ACCA predicates. In the context of the
Taylor-Mathis divide, this inventoried list of predicate crimes would
enumerate each and every burglary offense from each jurisdiction that
217. Id. § 13A-5-9(a)–(c).
218. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-501 (2015); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-801 (2017);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-606.5 (2016); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8 (West 2017); IOWA
CODE § 902.8 (1976); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.080(6)–(7) (West 1974); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 558.016 (West 2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-7.1 (West 2003); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.10
(McKinney 2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-106 (2010).
219. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-219 (2015).
220. Over twenty states have structured their habitual-offender statutes under such a
model to remove confusion and ensure that those meant to be sentenced as habitual
offenders do not escape just desserts through a legal technicality. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13-105, 13-701 (2015); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667, 1192.7(c)(1) (West 2012); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 53a-40 (2015); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-1804a, 23-1331(4) (West 2013); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 775.084 (West 2016); HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-606.5(1)(a)–(ee) (2016); MD. CODE
ANN. CRIM. LAW § 14-101 (West 2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 279 § 25 (West 2012);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 769.12(6) (2012); MINN. STAT. § 609.1095 (2014); MISS. CODE ANN.
§§ 99-19-83, 97-3-2 (2014); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2221 (2006); NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.012
(2014); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:6 (2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-23 (2004); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-09.1 (2017); 42 PA CONS. STAT. § 9714(g) (2012); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS §§ 22-7-8.1, 22-1-2(9) (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-120 (1995); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 12.42 (West 2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.5 (West 2013); VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-297.1 (2000); W.VA. CODE § 61-11-18(b) (2000); WIS. STAT. § 939.62 (2016).
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qualified as a predicate. Practically, federal judges would only need to
confirm that the defendant was convicted of a particular statute from a
particular state, and the job would be done. Applying this approach would
be even simpler in a majority of cases in which habitual offenders concede
their past convictions. The benefits of this listing approach are many and
have been recognized by jurists and commentators alike as a way to
simplify the Act’s application.221
While the practical application of a listing approach has appeal, one of
the primary problems with such an approach is the extensive research into
the voluminous criminal codes of all the states and other jurisdictions that
would be required to compile an exhaustive list. Such a herculean task
would cost tremendous amounts of time and resources. Such a task could be
completed, however, under the familiar committee approach we have seen
in other large judicial endeavors. Committees of judges, academics, and
policy makers have come together before to gift the legal community with
accomplishments such as the Rules of Civil,222 Criminal,223 and Appellate
Procedure,224 and the comprehensive Sentencing Guidelines.225 Still today,
221. See, e.g., Chambers v. United States¸ 555 U.S. 122, 134 (Alito, J., concurring)
(“[T]he only tenable, long-term solution is for Congress to formulate a specific list of
expressly defined crimes that are deemed to be worthy of ACCA’s sentencing
enhancement.”), abrogated by Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015); Lee, supra
note 21, at 7–8; Kupfer, supra note 24, at 155; Montgomery, supra note 192, at 736.
222. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were created and maintained through a joint
effort of the Supreme Court, the House Committee on the Judiciary, and a Committee on
Rules and Practice and Procedure, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and the Judicial Conference of the United States. See Bob Goodlatte, Foreword
to FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE iii (2011).
223. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are very similar in terms of origin and
maintenance to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Rules were created and are
maintained through a joint effort of the Supreme Court, the House Committee on the
Judiciary, and a Committee on Rules and Practice and Procedure, the Advisory Committee
on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the Judicial Conference of the United
States. See id.
224. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure are again very similar in terms of origin
and maintenance to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Rules were created and are
maintained through a joint effort of the Supreme Court, the House Committee on the
Judiciary, and a Committee on Rules and Practice and Procedure, the Advisory Committee
on the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the Judicial Conference of the United
States. See id.
225. The United States Sentencing Commission, “an independent agency in the judicial
branch composed of seven voting and two non-voting, ex officio members,” compiles the
United States Sentencing Guidelines and submits amendments every year. U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1 pt. A (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).
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committees continue to work perennially to update these large bodies of
work as they see fit. What distinguishes large-scale projects like the Codes
of Procedure and the suggested inventoried list of ACCA predicates is
scope. While the former is used and referred to by millions in the legal
community, the ACCA does not have that kind of reach. Thus, the judicial
community may not view the use of the committee system to create a list of
ACCA predicates as a benefit commensurate with the needs of the judicial
system. Nevertheless, given the sum of judicial resources being spent on
ACCA litigation,226 it is quite possible that the resources saved by the
judiciary and the value of a much-needed clarification for practitioners
would outweigh the costs of such a committee.
The time and resources necessary to complete this task, however, may
not be as problematic as the potential political fallout if Congress were to
get such a comprehensive list wrong. Congress might be wary of compiling
such a list because they may be blamed by the public when habitual
offenders slip through the cracks as a result of the non-inclusion of various
predicate felonies on the so-called exhaustive list.227 While lists are often a
source of easy application, they are also a source of potential problems if
the list is not exhaustive enough. Thus, laws like the ACCA that enumerate
crimes usually leave the heavy lifting (and potential blame) to the courts to
determine if an unenumerated crime is enough like the enumerated crimes
to be encompassed by the Act. Unfortunately, it was this discretion of the
courts that has gotten us into this current predicament in the first place,
evidence that a new, exhaustive list approach may be worth the resources
required to bring it about.
B. Proving Predicate Offenses by Looking at the Punishment and
Classification of the Convicting State
The most widespread approach among the states offers yet another
simple solution: determining predicate felonies based solely on the
punishment they garner in the state of conviction. While this
straightforward approach has appeal due to its elementary nature and ease
of application, it is unlikely to be a solution for the federal courts because,
like the categorical approach, this solution would mandate that federal
courts rely heavily on state law to apply the ACCA.

226. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
227. Lee, supra note 21, at 8 (“Probably the biggest obstacle to the inventory approach,
however, is political. For Congress to create such exhaustive lists is for Congress to invite
blame when individual recidivists fall through the cracks.”).
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Arizona, along with states like Hawaii and Oregon, follows this
approach,228 determining predicates in part by determining whether the
crime “was punishable by [the other] jurisdiction as a felony.”229
Mississippi has gone even further by explicitly stating that the “plain
language” of its habitual-offender statute “does not require that the prior
convictions must also be felonies in Mississippi; rather, they must be
felonies in the state where the conviction occurred.”230 Thus, these habitualoffender statutes truly give full faith and credit to the laws of other states, at
times counting predicate felonies from these convicting states that may not
be classified as felonies in the current forum.
Massachusetts’s doctrine differs slightly because it determines predicate
felonies based partly on the actual sentence and partly on time served in
prison for the predicate offense.231 Kentucky employs a similar approach,
requiring that predicate felony convictions be “accompanied by a sentence
of imprisonment for one year.”232 These habitual-offender statutes not only
refer to the potential punishment of predicate crimes in other jurisdictions;
instead, these statutes also rely on the actual punishment that was meted out
by the convicting state.233 In other words, these states place more
importance on the actual punishment that an offender received for his prior
crime as opposed to whether the prior crime was merely punishable as a
228. HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-606.5 (2016); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.725(2)(c) (2008); see
also ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-4-501 (2017), 5-4-503 (1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-1817(d)(2)(c) (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-09.1.c (2017); Iowa v. Gillison, 766 N.W.2d
649 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009).
229. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-105(e) (2015).
230. Logan v. State, 2012-KA-01963-COA, 192 So. 3d 1012, 1021 (Miss. Ct. App.
2015) (finding that Kentucky conviction qualified as predicate offense because it was
considered a felony in that jurisdiction); see also State v. Allen, 2001 MT 266, ¶ 20, 37 P.3d
655, 659 (Mont. 2001) (finding that prior California crime could serve as predicate offense
because of its status as a felony as defined by the California Code); Gunderson v. State, 925
P.2d 1300, 1305 (Wyo. 1996) (“The fact that the previous convictions were felonies in the
rendering states but may not have been felonies in Wyoming is immaterial. The convictions
were still felony convictions.”).
231. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 279, § 25(a) (West 2012) (In 2012, Massachusetts
amended its habitual-offender statute to apply to predicate offenses in other jurisdictions in
which the defendant was “sentenced to state prison or state correctional facility . . . for a
term not less than 3 years by . . . another state, or the United States.”).
232. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.080 (commentary) (West 2012).
233. See also State v. King, 724 N.W. 2d 80, 84 (Neb. 2006) (finding that the state must
show, among other things, that the offender was “sentenced and committed to prison for not
less than 1 year” for a crime from another jurisdiction to qualify as a predicate); State v.
Russo, 62 A.3d 798, 808 (N.H. 2013) (finding similarly to King).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018

662

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:623

felony. Perhaps the logic behind such a distinction is based on a premise
that those who are actually sentenced to over a year in prison (as opposed to
those who could have been sentenced to such a term, but were not) are the
hardened criminals who actually deserved such a sentence.
The states justify this punishment approach as a way to “achieve a
uniform standard for grading foreign convictions.”234 While this approach
indeed establishes a uniform application, it threatens fundamental fairness
by treating offenders differently based on the differences in state criminal
codes. Thus, two offenders who committed the same crime in two different
states, say California and Arizona, could be treated differently if they were
to go on to each commit a felony in Nevada. If the Nevada courts used the
punishment approach, the California offender may be sentenced under
Nevada’s habitual-offender statute because California treated the prior
offense as a felony; in contrast, the Arizona offender would not receive the
harsher sentence of the habitual-offender statute because the same conduct
committed in Arizona was not considered a felony by Arizona law.
Much like the current ACCA doctrine, federal judges would find
themselves parsing state law235 and basing their determinations of predicate
felonies on the different ways the fifty states utilize their police powers in
their respective criminal codes. This is exactly the type of disparate
treatment based on state law variances that the current categorical approach
suffers from and that federal lawmakers sought to avoid when they crafted
the ACCA.236
C. Determining Predicate Offenses with a Conduct-Based Approach
While the listing- and punishment-based approaches are both
problematic, a promising paradigm shift may be found in a conduct-based
approach. Such an approach—as opposed to the current elements-based
categorical approach—would greatly simplify current ACCA doctrine.
Several states successfully rely on a conduct-based approach, which
considers the criminal conduct of habitual offenders’ past crimes when
determining if the past crimes should count as predicates.
In Michigan, for example, a court was tasked with deciding whether an
offender’s prior conviction for aggravated assault in Ohio should be
counted as a predicate under Michigan’s habitual-offender statute.237 Rather
than trudging through a comparison of the elements of the offenses, the
234.
235.
236.
237.

HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 706-655 (commentary) (West 1986).
See supra notes 175–177 and accompanying text.
See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
People v. Quintanilla, 571 N.W.2d 228, 288 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
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court held that “the facts of the out-of-state crime, rather than the words or
title of the out-of-state statute under which the conviction arose, are
determinative.”238 Alabama courts have echoed this logic, holding that “[i]n
determining whether an out-of-state conviction will be used to enhance
punishment pursuant to the [habitual-offender statute], the conduct upon
which the foreign conviction is based must be considered and not the
foreign jurisdiction’s treatment of that conduct.”239 Thus, Alabama courts
bypass an examination of the similar elements of the out-of-state crime and
the generic or Alabama parallel offense and look instead to the conduct. In
other words, if the conduct in the other state would have been a predicate
offense if committed in the sentencing state, the out-of-state conviction
counts as a predicate.
Several other states have followed suit. Indiana, for example, analyzes
“out-of-state convictions as if they had been committed in Indiana.”240
Thus, in cases like Lampitok v. State,241 the court examined the offender’s
conduct in a prior Illinois conviction for “delivery of a controlled substance
and criminal drug conspiracy,” and found that, under Indiana law, the
conduct did not constitute any of the predicate offenses listed in Indiana’s
habitual-offender statute.242 Delaware243 and the District of Columbia244
have also hinted at examining conduct, as opposed to elements, to
determine whether out-of-state convictions should be considered predicate
offenses under their respective habitual-offender statutes.
Louisiana goes even further—its habitual-offender statute memorializes
the understanding that out-of-state crimes can serve as predicates for
Louisiana’s habitual-offender statute if the crime, “if committed in this

238. Id.
239. Skinner v. State, 987 So. 2d 1172, 1175 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006) (quoting Daniels v.
State, 621 So. 2d 335, 342 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992)).
240. Weiss v. State, 903 N.E.2d 557, 561 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
241. 817 N.E.2d 630 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
242. Id. at 644.
243. Delaware considers the underlying conduct of out-of-state convictions if there is
ambiguous language in the out-of-state law. See, e.g., Sammons v. State, 68 A.3d 192, 19596 (Del. 2013); Hall v. Delaware, 788 A.2d 118, 128 (Del. 2001) (“Delaware courts have
said that in order to qualify as a predicate offense, the conduct leading to an out-of-state
judgment must be such that it would have supported a conviction for the appropriate
predicate offense in Delaware.”).
244. See Brake v. United States, 494 A.2d 646, 650 (1985) (“We hold that, as to the
assault and sodomy crimes at issue here, the phrase “‘necessarily includes’ may be construed
by reference to the facts of the previous crime, not merely to the statutory elements of that
crime.”).
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State would be a felony.”245 Following this statutory instruction, a
Louisiana court looked to an offender’s conduct in State v. Grimes to find
the offender “fired six shots at a uniformed Alabama State Trooper,”246 and
“[i]n connection with that Alabama offense, defendant pled guilty to the
attempted murder of a police officer which is a felony in Louisiana.”247
Georgia, however, has gone the furthest, suggesting that merely
analyzing the elements of a prior offense is not enough. In Lewis v. State,
the court examined a prior Tennessee conviction for aggravated assault, but
found that merely examining the elements of that crime did not suffice
because “[i]t is possible that Lewis was convicted under this provision, and
this conduct may not constitute a felony in Georgia.”248 Accordingly, the
defendant’s habitual-offender sentence was overturned and the matter was
remanded to the sentencing court to either find information regarding the
underlying conduct of the Tennessee conviction or resentence the offender
without applying the habitual-offender statute.249
California, along with states like Pennsylvania250 and Washington,251
have adopted somewhat of a hybrid approach that considers the underlying
245. LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:529.1(a) (2010).
246. 16 So. 3d 418, 427 (La. Ct. App. 2009); see also State v. Uloho, 875 So. 2d 918,
928–29 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (“For a conviction from another state to serve as a predicate
felony for purposes for enhancement, the conviction must be for a ‘crime which, if
committed in this state would be a felony . . . .’”) (alteration in original) (quoting LA. STAT.
ANN. § 15:529.1(a)(1) (2010)).
247. Grimes, 16 So. 3d at 427.
248. 587 S.E.2d 245, 246-47 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003); see also Walker v. Hale, 657 S.E.2d
227, 230 (Ga. 2008) (“Although the language of the indictment does not directly track the
language found in Georgia’s murder statute, OCGA § 16-5-1, it is sufficient to show that the
same offense, if committed in this State, would constitute a serious violent felony as defined
in OCGA § 17-10-6.1(a).”); Smith v. State, 527 S.E.2d 609, 609 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)
(finding that Florida indictment was “sufficient to prove that defendant was convicted of two
offenses in Florida which would have each been the serious violent felony of armed robbery
had the offenses been committed in Georgia”).
249. Lewis, 587 S.E.2d at 246–47.
250. See Commonwealth v. Spenny, 128 A.3d 234, 250 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015) (looking to
“facts underlying the prior conviction” once the court compares the elements of the two
crimes “for grading purposes”).
251. See In re Pers. Restraint of Lavery, 111 P.3d 837, 841 (Wash. 2005) (looking first to
whether the “elements of the Washington crime and the foreign crime” are substantially
similar, then looking “at the defendant’s conduct, as evidenced by the indictment or
information, to determine if the conduct itself would have violated a comparable
Washington statute”). West Virginia follows a similar procedure. See State v. Hulbert, 544
S.E.2d 919, 926 (W. Va. 2001) (“Given these statutory variances, the factual predicates upon
which the convictions in Michigan rested must be shown in order to bring the Michigan
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facts of an offender’s past convictions along with the elements of the crime.
In People v. McGee,252 the California Supreme Court articulated that, in
order for an out-of-state offense to qualify as a predicate crime, it “must
involve conduct that would qualify as a serious felony in California.”253
Accordingly, courts are allowed to examine the entire record “to determine
the nature or basis of the crime of which the defendant was convicted.”254
The California Supreme Court also rejected a strictly elements-based
approach in People v. Avery.255 In a case that is particularly applicable to
the Taylor-Mathis jurisprudence, the California court had to decide whether
a defendant’s prior conviction in Texas for “burglary of a habitation with
intent to commit theft” qualified as a predicate offense for California’s
habitual-offender statute.256 When analyzing the record of conviction, the
court held that it did not have enough information because “[o]n this
record . . . we know nothing about the nature of the Texas crime beyond its
statutory requirements and the fact that the underlying intent was to commit
theft.”257 Somewhat like Georgia,258 the Court found that the bare elements
alone, without any underlying facts, were not enough to determine whether
the Texas offense should be considered a California predicate because “the
question is whether a Texas conviction . . . under Texas law necessarily
involves conduct that would qualify as [the parallel felony] under California
law.”259 In People v. Jones,260 the California Court of Appeal similarly held
that when a comparison of elements left ambiguity, the habitual-offender
statute did not apply because the record of the previous crime of bank
robbery did not contain the underlying facts of that conviction.261
This “California Rule,” which places heavy emphasis on a criminal’s
underlying conduct in tandem with the elements of the prior crime, has
been followed for over twenty-five years. The rule is driven by common
sense and “promotes the efficient administration of justice and, specifically,

convictions within the ambit of the West Virginia statute for enhanced punishment of
subsequent domestic violence offenses.”).
252. 133 P.3d 1054 (Cal. 2006).
253. Id. at 1059 (quoting People v. Avery, 38 P.3d 1, 2 (Cal. 2002)).
254. Id. (citing People v. Woodell, 950 P.2d 85, 89-93 (Cal. 1998)).
255. 38 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2002).
256. Id. at 3.
257. Id. at 2.
258. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
259. Avery, 38 P.3d at 3.
260. 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 485 (Ct. App. 1999).
261. Id. at 497-98.
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furthers the evident intent of the people in establishing an enhancement . . .
that refers to conduct, not a specific crime.”262
Of all the state-based approaches, the conduct-based approach is the
most promising and perhaps the most obvious. As one commentator put it,
the problems of the categorical approach “seem to be eas[ily] resolve[d] if
courts could simply look at the facts and determine whether the defendants
actually engaged in any violent or risky activity.”263 Were federal courts to
follow a conduct-based approach when interpreting the ACCA, this
straightforward and intuitive approach would not only lead to consistent
results, but would also save judicial economy.
In practice, federal judges would no longer have to parse through state
law and compare the elements of the predicate offense to the generic
version of the offense, embarking on a complicated procedural journey if
the elements did not line up perfectly (as they so rarely do). Instead, the
sentencing judge would merely look to Shepard documents—such as an
indictment or plea colloquy—to find the conduct on which the defendant’s
predicate offense was based. Based on this conduct, the judge would be
able to determine whether the defendant actually committed what would be
considered a predicate felony under the generic version of a crime, such as
burglary. For example, in Mathis, if the defendant admitted in his prior plea
that he in fact burgled a building, and not a boat or airplane, then the
conduct he committed in Iowa would qualify because it comports with
generic burglary. In cases where the Shepard documents do not delineate
the criminal conduct, the government would not be able to meet its burden
of proof and the ACCA could not apply. This simple and intuitive conductbased approach would no doubt streamline ACCA sentencing and cut down
on the litigation that floods federal criminal dockets.264
The conduct-based approach would also solve the ideological problems
that plague the current doctrine by ensuring that offenders are punished for
their conduct and that they do not escape their intended punishment because
of a legal technicality. At its root, the conduct-based approach comports
with the justice system’s theory of just deserts, which includes punishing
offenders for their criminal actions. Thus, the bizarre and nonsensical
results often bemoaned by judges would decline. No longer would habitual
262. People v. Guerrero, 748 P.2d 1150, 1157 (Cal. 1988).
263. Powell, supra note 37, at 8; see also Timothy W. Castor, Note, Escaping a Rigid
Analysis: The Shift to a Fact-Based Approach for Crime of Violence Inquiries Involving
Escape Offenses, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 345, 362–71 (2004) (proposing that courts
employ a fact-based approach to analyze escape cases).
264. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
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offenders—like the burglar and sex-offender in Mathis—escape just
punishment based on state law not comporting with a generic definition of
burglary.
Finally, the conduct-based approach does not result in differentiated
application based on jurisdiction. Whether a criminal commits an offense in
Montana or Maine, California or Kentucky, on the West Coast or the East
Coast, he or she will be judged by his or her actions. If a person burgles a
building in Kentucky, he or she will be treated the same under the ACCA as
the offender who burgles a building in California. Even though Kentucky’s
burglary statute may define and punish burglary differently than in
California, the technical differences in these states’ penal codes would have
no bearing on punishment under the ACCA. The conduct-based approach
does not spend its time in the ivory tower comparing elements, but punishes
offenders practically based on actual conduct. Thus, no matter the state in
which the offender committed a predicate offense, the conduct-based
approach would look at the offender’s conduct alone and determine whether
it would fulfill the elements of the generic version of the crime.
Lending further support to this doctrinal change is the fact that the
modified categorical approach already veers awfully close to a conductbased approach. When sentencing courts are instructed to look at charging
documents and plea colloquies, these courts are necessarily looking at the
conduct described in these documents in order to discern the set of
alternative elements under which the defendant was convicted. In Taylor,
for example, the Court remanded the case to the Eighth Circuit, which
looked to the charging documents and ultimately found that the defendant
burgled a house.265 The Court must be able to admit that, for all practical
purposes, the underlying conduct of a defendant’s past crimes is
inextricably tied to the elements that the prosecuting authority charges the
defendant with. The conduct determines the crime that the defendant is
charged with, and thus the modified categorical approach—which
supposedly looks only at Shepard documents to determine elements—
necessarily takes conduct into account.266
265. United States v. Taylor, 932 F.2d 703, 707 (8th Cir. 1991).
266. Further, some federal courts have already adopted a conduct-based approach when
applying other federal habitual-offender statutes. See United States v. Johnson, 479 F. App’x
811, 819 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding that federal three strikes law, 18 U.S.C. § 3559 (2012),
“unmistakably requires courts to look to the specific facts underlying the prior offense, not
to the elements of the statute under which the defendant was convicted”) (quoting United
States v. Mackovich, 209 F.3d 1227, 1240 (10th Cir. 2000)); see also United States v.
Sanchez, 586 F.3d 918, 930 (11th Cir. 2009) (finding that “[a] state drug offense qualifies as
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1. Apprendi and the Sixth Amendment Do Not Foreclose a ConductBased Approach
The biggest potential precedential hurdle for the conduct-based
approach, as the Supreme Court has contemplated, is that it may run afoul
of Apprendi v. New Jersey,267 a case holding that “only a jury, not a judge,
may find facts that increase a maximum penalty [called for in a statute].”268
Consequently, any fact that can be used to enhance the offender’s sentence
beyond the statutory maximum must be presented to a jury and proven
beyond a reasonable doubt pursuant to the offender’s Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial.269 Thus, the Court270 and commentators271 alike have
shied away from using a conduct-based approach because it would require
sentencing judges to “find facts” about a habitual offender’s prior criminal
conduct that could boost his sentence above the statutory maximum.
Others on the Court, however, have expressed doubt that Apprendi
“compel[s] the elements based approach.”272 In fact, in Justice Breyer’s
dissent in Mathis, which was joined by Justice Ginsburg, he specifically
stated his position that Apprendi did not “require the majority’s result”
because of the practical synonymy of the elements and means of a crime
when presented to a jury.273 When combined with Justices Kennedy and
Thomas,274 at least four of the justices agree that Apprendi either does not
control in ACCA litigation or otherwise does not preclude a conduct-based

a ‘serious drug offense’ under § 3559(c) only if the offense, if prosecuted in federal court,
would have been punishable under [21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)] or [21 U.S.C. §
960(b)(1)(A)]”).
267. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
268. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2252 (2016) (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at
490); see also Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 601–02 (1990) (anticipating potential
Sixth Amendment issues presented in Apprendi, and finding that an elements-based
approach would be safest to prevent potential Sixth Amendment violations).
269. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
270. See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2252; Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2288–
89 (2013); Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601–02.
271. Rebecca Sharpless, Finally, a True Elements Test: Mathis v. United States and the
Categorical Approach, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 1275, 1295-98 (2012) (arguing that Apprendi
prevents a purely conduct-based approach).
272. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2258 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also id. at 2259 (Thomas,
J., concurring) (acknowledging that “Apprendi recognized an exception for the ‘fact of a
prior conviction,’” and stating the position that Apprendi was wrongly decided).
273. Id. at 2265 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
274. See supra note 272.
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approach; given the current composition of the Court, this position may
soon become the majority.275
The states have also interpreted Apprendi, many finding that its holding
does not apply to their habitual-offender statutes because Apprendi
“expressly carved out an exception for prior convictions.”276 In other words,
Apprendi itself stated that prior convictions can be presented to sentencing
judges to enhance sentences beyond the statutory maximum, and need not
be presented to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.277
In particular, Apprendi carved out this exception for facts of prior
convictions because “[b]oth the certainty that procedural safeguards
attached to any ‘fact’ of prior conviction . . . mitigated the due process and
Sixth Amendment concerns otherwise implicated in allowing a judge to
determine a ‘fact’ increasing punishment beyond the maximum of the
statutory range.”278 Said another way, the due process that was afforded to
the offender during the proceedings related to his or her prior offense
minimizes the possibility of a judge’s erroneous fact-finding during
sentencing for a subsequent crime. After all, the judge is simply relying on
the fact of a prior conviction that was adequately protected by the
procedural safeguards in that prior case.279 In addition, the Court has
275. Lee, supra note 129, at 270 (positing that the categorical approach’s fate depends
largely on who was selected to fill the vacancy of the late Justice Antonin Scalia). Justice
Scalia has been succeeded by Justice Neal Gorsuch, and the ultimate fate of Apprendi’s
application and the categorical based approach remains to be seen, as these matters have not
come before the Court during his short tenure.
276. Redd v. State, 635 S.E.2d 870, 871 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006); see also Reed v. State, 121
A.3d 1234 (Table), 2015 WL 667525 (Del. 2015) (finding that Alleyne v. United States, 133
S. Ct. 2151 (2013) did not require the fact of a defendant’s prior conviction to be submitted
to a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt); Louisiana v. Juengain, 41 So. 3d 499, 506–07
(La. Ct. App. 2010) (finding that Apprendi did not require the fact of a defendant’s prior
convictions to submitted to a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt). But see State v. Auld,
361 P.3d 471, 475 (Haw. 2015) (finding that because Hawaii’s habitual-offender statute
required more than merely proving the facts of prior convictions to enhance a defendant’s
sentence, that Apprendi did apply and that these additional facts must be presented to a jury
to be found beyond a reasonable doubt before a defendant can be sentenced as a habitual
offender).
277. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 489–90 (2000) (addressing and declining to
overturn Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999) and Almandarez-Torres v. United
States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998)).
278. Id. at 488.
279. See In re Pers. Restraint of Lavery, 111 P.3d 837, 842 (Wash. 2005) (holding that
“[n]o additional safeguards are required” when a judge is basing a sentence on a prior
conviction “because a certified copy of a prior judgment and sentence is highly reliable
evidence”).
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expressed particular concern with regard to allowing a sentencing court to
“make a disputed determination” about the facts of what the “state judge
must have understood as the factual basis of the prior plea.”280 But such a
concern is unwarranted in a majority of cases, such as in Mathis, where the
facts underlying the prior conviction are uncontested and when the plea
colloquy or sentencing documents contain a clear recitation of stipulated
facts.
In McGee, the California Supreme Court wrestled with this issue,
ultimately finding that Apprendi did not foreclose its conduct-based
approach to determining predicate offenses.281 The court found that there
was a distinction to be made between “sentence enhancements that require
fact finding related to the circumstance of the current offense, such as
whether a defendant acted with the intent necessary to establish a ‘hate
crime’—a task identified by Apprendi as one for the jury” and the
distinguishable scenario where a court simply examines “court records
pertaining to a defendant’s prior conviction to determine the nature or basis
of the conviction—a task to which Apprendi did not speak and the ‘type of
inquiry that judges traditionally perform as part of the sentencing
function.’”282 In so holding, the court outlined several cases from other
states similarly holding that Apprendi did not foreclose a judge from
accepting facts about an offender’s prior convictions in connection with
habitual-offender statutes.283

280. Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2288 (2013); Shepard v. United States,
544 U.S. 13, 25 (2005).
281. People v. McGee, 133 P.3d 1054, 1071 (Cal. 2006).
282. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting People v. Kelii, 981 P.2d 518, 520 (Cal. 1999))t.
283. See id. at 1067-69 (citing Wright v. State, 780 So. 2d 216, 217 (Fla. Ct. App. 2001)
(holding that defendant did not have a right to a jury trial to determine the fact of a prior
conviction); People v. Hill, 803 N.E.2d 138, 150 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (holding that there is no
right to a jury trial on facts relating to recidivism, including “the fact of the timing, degree,
number and sequence of defendant’s prior convictions,” or “on his age for purpose of
enhancement under the recidivist sentencing statute”); State v. Stewart, 791 A.2d 143, 15152 (Md. 2002) (“[I]n light of the language in Apprendi suggesting that sentencing courts
traditionally consider matters related to recidivism, courts have found that the Almendarez–
Torres exception to the right to a jury trial is not limited solely to prior convictions.”); State
v. Dixon 787 A.2d 211, 221 (N.J. 2001) (holding there is no right to a jury trial where “[t]he
required fact-finding does not relate to the present offense or its elements”) (emphasis
added); People v. Rosen, 752 N.E.2d 844, 847 (N.Y. 2001) (holding that the “[d]efendant
had no constitutional right to a jury trial to establish the facts of his prior felony convictions”
including “matters pertaining to the defendant’s history and character and the nature and
circumstances of his criminal conduct”)).
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Michigan’s approach is particularly interesting, holding that Apprendi
does not apply because the statutory maximum penalty for a habitual
offender is based on the habitual-offender statute, not on the statute under
which the actual crime was committed.284 Thus, Apprendi’s holding would
never be triggered since the habitual offender’s sentence would never go
over the statutory maximum of the habitual-offender statute.
In short, the Supreme Court’s apprehension that Apprendi requires an
elements-based approach—and forecloses a conduct-based approach—is
not justified. Apprendi specifically allows an exception for judges to find
facts of prior convictions pursuant to habitual-offender statutes. Thus, a
court need not submit facts of the defendant’s conduct in a prior conviction
to a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt; rather, a judge can rely on
uncontested evidence in the record of these prior convictions to enhance a
defendant’s sentence. Therefore, given the unlikely application of Apprendi
to the ACCA, there is little standing in the way of instituting a conductbased approach.
2. Even if Apprendi Applies, Federal Courts Could Amend Their
Sentencing Practices to Overcome Any Sixth Amendment Hurdles
Even if Apprendi or other related cases did present an impediment to the
conduct-based approach,285 many states have circumvented any issues by
adopting criminal procedures to ensure that a criminal’s status as a habitual
offender is presented to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. By
combining the conduct-based approach with the procedural method of
proving past criminal conduct beyond a reasonable doubt—perhaps in a
separate proceeding—any Apprendi problem would be avoided because the
very facts that would enhance a habitual offender’s sentence beyond the
statutory maximum would be presented to a jury, which would be required
to confirm these facts beyond a reasonable doubt before the defendant
could be sentenced as a habitual offender.

284. People v. Drohan, 715 N.W.2d 778, 790 (Mich. 2006) (“[T]he statutory maximum
sentence of a defendant who is convicted of being an habitual offender is as provided in the
habitual-offender statute, rather than the statute he or she was convicted of offending.
Apprendi and Blakely specifically allow for an increase in a defendant’s maximum sentence
on the basis of ‘the fact of a prior conviction . . . .’”) (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466, 490 (2000)).
285. See also Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155 (2013) (holding that facts
that increase a mandatory minimum sentence of a crime should be considered and that the
“element” of the crime must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt).
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In Indiana, for example (a conduct-based jurisdiction), “habitual offender
proceedings are treated as substantive criminal trials. The State must prove
the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt.”286 While many states treat their
habitual-offender statutes merely as sentencing enhancements subject to the
purview of the sentencing judge,287 the states that submit these matters to a
jury extend protections to habitual offenders based on the notion that such
protections “reflect[] the serious consequences of such a determination.”288
Therefore, “[t]he State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt prior
convictions alleged for enhancement.”289
While this approach would cure any potential Sixth Amendment issues
concerning sentence-enhancing facts and their presentation to a jury,290 it
may also prejudice the defendant with regard to his or her current charge.
286. Moore v. State, 769 N.E.2d 1141, 1146 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
287. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1804(a) (West 2013); Smith v. United States, 304
A.2d 28, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (finding that habitual-offender statute only came into play after
defendant had been found guilty, and habitual-offender status need not be charged in
indictment).
288. Moore, 769 N.E.2d at 1146.
289. Reynolds v. State, 227 S.W.3d 355, 359 (Tex. App. 2007); see also Conner v. State,
138 So. 3d 143, 151 (Miss. 2014) (“At [the habitual sentencing] hearing, the elements in the
applicable habitual-offender statute must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”); State v.
McClain, 302 P.3d 367, 372 (Idaho Ct. App. 2012) (“The former convictions relied upon to
invoke the persistent violator enhancement must be alleged in the indictment or information
and be proved at trial beyond a reasonable doubt.”); State v. Cooper, 321 S.W.3d 501, 505
(Tenn. 2010) (“[T]he court must find ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is a
repeat violent offender’ for purpose of sentencing.” (citation omitted)); People v. Nunn, 148
P.3d 222, 225 (Colo. App. 2006) (“In habitual criminal proceedings, the prosecution bears
the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has been previously
convicted as alleged.”); State ex rel. Appleby v. Recht, 583 S.E.2d 800, 808 (W. Va. 2002)
(holding that the state must prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant’s prior
predicates were “committed subsequent to each preceding conviction” and that the defendant
is the person who committed them); Martin v. Commonwealth, 13 S.W.3d 232, 235 (Ky.
2000) (“[T]he Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, and could not by
inference or guess work, confer persistent felony status on anyone.”); State v. Sinclair, 439
A.2d 945, 946 (Conn. 1981) (“The state has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt the elements essential to establish that the defendant is a persistent felony offender.”);
State v. Cameron, 227 A.2d 276, 279 (Vt. 1967) (“[I]t becomes the duty of the prosecuting
officer to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the fact or facts denied. But the guilt or
innocence of the respondent respecting any former conviction is not an issue.”).
290. But see Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 239–47 (1998) (holding
that 8 U.S.C. § 1326, a statute that punished recidivists more harshly in the immigration
context, did not require the government to charge the offender as a recidivist, and that the
offender’s prior crimes were merely sentencing enhancing factors that were not elements
that needed to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt).
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At least one state, Michigan, specifically prohibits information of an
offender’s past crimes from being contained in the indictment and from
being presented to a jury to prevent these past acts from tainting the jury’s
finding of guilt on the current charge.291 For this same reason, the Federal
Rules of Evidence prohibit presenting evidence to a jury of a defendant’s
criminal history in order to prove propensity that he also committed the
current offense.292
In an effort to prevent such prejudice, many states that require the fact of
a prior conviction to be presented to a jury have also adopted a bifurcated
criminal trial, in which information of the defendant’s past crimes are only
presented to a jury after the jury has already found the defendant guilty of
the instant offense.293 This bifurcated trial procedure affords defendants
additional due process and prevents any prejudice that may arise from
presenting the offender’s prior criminal history during the guilt phase of the
proceedings. This added process, however, comes at the expense of the time
of the jury and of judicial resources.
Adoption of this approach in the federal system may also take on a
bifurcated trial approach, which would tax judicial economy in the
relatively small percentage of criminal cases actually go to trial.294 In most
cases under this potential practice, however, a defendant would be
presented with an indictment that would note their prior convictions and the
government’s intent to prove that the offender is an armed career criminal
under the ACCA. This additional charge would then be a part of the plea
bargaining process, and many defendants may concede such charge, while
others may negotiate this charge away through the bargaining process.
Thus, judicial economy would not be unnecessarily taxed, since so few
federal criminal cases actually go to trial;295 however, the approach would
save enormous amounts of time and judicial resources by ensuring a simple
291. People v. Everson, 168 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969).
292. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
293. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 680 So. 2d 843, 851 (Miss. 1996) (holding that a
sentencing hearing must be separate from trial on the principle charge, but the facts at the
sentencing hearing still must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt). Indiana also separates
the indictment into separate documents. Lawrence v. State, 286 N.E.2d 830, 835 (Ind. 1972)
(“In the first the particular offense with which the accused is charged should be set forth, and
this should be upon the first page of the information and signed by the prosecuting officer. In
the second part former convictions should be alleged, and this should be upon the second
page of the information, separable from the first page and signed by the prosecuting
officer.”).
294. See supra note 22–24.
295. Id.
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conduct-based approach that protects offenders’ Sixth Amendment rights
by presenting facts of prior convictions to a jury if necessary.
3. Other Potential Roadblocks of Judicial Fact-finding and Plea
Agreements Are Easily Overcome
Apart from potential Sixth Amendment issues, the Court has also
forwarded other supposed hurdles to adopting a conduct-based approach
that, upon further examination, are not significant enough to outweigh the
substantial benefits of the conduct-based approach.
One interesting argument the Court has returned to several times is the
“daunting difficulties” of applying a conduct-based approach, including the
taxation of judicial economy and difficulty for the government to “expend
resources examining (often aged) documents for evidence that a defendant
admitted in a plea colloquy, or a prosecutor showed at trial, facts that,
although unnecessary to the crime of conviction, satisfy an element of the
relevant generic offense.”296 The Court’s concerns over judicial economy
are simply unfounded. If current experience is any indication, it seems like
any change to the categorical approach would reap benefits for the courts’
resources.297 The judicial fact-finding required by the conduct-based
approach would not require extensive mini-trials or significant digging into
antiquated records but would merely be an extension of the modified
categorical approach. Plea colloquies, jury instructions, jury forms, and
other approved documents that show uncontested facts or facts found
beyond a reasonable doubt would suffice. If the government could not meet
its burden to produce such records sufficient for the court to make such a
factual determination of the conduct of the predicate offenses, the ACCA
would not apply. This logical repurposing of the modified categorical
approach is painless and is already in line with what many courts, in
practice, are currently doing.298
Along a similar vein, the Court has also argued against a conduct-based
approach by noting it would be unfair to habitual offenders if their prior
predicate offenses were the result of plea deals for which they pleaded to a
lower offense. For example, “if a guilty plea to a lesser, nonburglary
offense was the result of a plea bargain, it would seem unfair to impose a
sentence enhancement as if the defendant had pleaded guilty to burglary”
based on the underlying facts of the actual burglary that was committed. 299
296.
297.
298.
299.

Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2289 (2013).
See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 601–02 (1990).
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Thus, as the Court reasoned, “a later sentencing court could still treat the
defendant as though he had pleaded to an ACCA predicate, based on legally
extraneous statements found in the old record.”300 While this concern has
merit due to the incredibly high percentage of criminal cases that are
resolved through plea deals,301 it nevertheless flouts the spirit of the ACCA,
which is to increase punishment for habitual offenders.
From an ideological standpoint, if the goal of habitual-offender laws is to
protect the public by incapacitating offenders who have failed multiple
attempts at rehabilitation, sentencing courts should indeed be able to look to
the past conduct of the predicate crimes. Courts should not be hamstrung by
yet another legal technicality such as the deal struck by the government to
punish the offender for a lesser crime.
From a practical standpoint, this supposed plea-bargaining problem is
easily remedied. For one, state and federal sentencing courts can advise
defendants who are entering pleas of the potential consequences that the
facts admitted in the plea colloquy could be used at a future date to serve as
a predicate to a state or federal habitual-offender statute. It is already
common practice for sentencing judges to thoroughly examine defendants
entering pleas on the record and inform them of their rights;302 an added
practice of informing defendants of potential sentencing consequences
down the road is already in line with current practice.
Second, state and federal prosecutors should be incentivized to notify
defendants of the potential future sentencing ramifications to admitting
certain facts in their plea deal. As part of the plea deal contract, 303
defendants should be able to negotiate and admit the appropriate facts if the
plea deal contains notice that these facts could be used against them in the
future if they are deemed to be habitual offenders.
Last, criminal defense attorneys should advise their clients of the
potential future ramifications. The Court has already required defense
attorneys to advise defendants entering pleas of potential future
300. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2289.
301. Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REVIEW BOOKS (Nov. 20,
2014),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty/
(finding that in 2013, ninety-seven percent of federal criminal cases were resolved through
plea bargains).
302. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (holding that a
guilty plea operates as a waiver of important rights, and is valid only if done
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, “with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences”).
303. See generally Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract,
101 YALE L.J. 1909 (1992).
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immigration consequences (such as pleading to a crime that could later be
considered a crime of moral turpitude that would disqualify the immigrant
from various forms of relief from deportation),304 so extending this rule to
the potential future habitual sentencing consequences is not an unwarranted
or cumbersome expansion of current doctrine. It is possible that these
notification safeguards—by the judge, prosecutor, and defense counsel—
may also have the unintended consequence of decreasing the willingness of
defendants to take a plea deal and plead guilty if such a plea could entail
such serious consequences. This is unlikely, though, since many repeat
offenders will likely be overconfident that they will either not commit a
crime again, or at least not be caught again.
VI. Conclusion
“It has been said that the life of the law is experience.”
-- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2560 (2015).
Based on the experience of the past twenty-five years of applying the
categorical approach, the life of the ACCA has been a disappointment. The
categorical approach as has proved to be a failed experiment in legal fiction
that nonsensically punishes habitual offenders based on the statutory
elements of prior offenses rather than the conduct of their those offenses.
The problem with such legal fiction is that the further down the rabbit hole
you go, the further divorced the fiction becomes from reality. With
Congress sitting on the sideline and with little indication of future action,305
the judiciary must act to solve the practical, ideological, and organizational
problems of the current doctrine.
The states have addressed this problem with much more success by
instituting simpler and more efficient approaches based on the practical
realities of criminal sentencing. Foremost among these approaches is a
clear, conduct-based approach that returns to reality by punishing habitual
offenders based on the consideration of the criminal conduct of their prior
304. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010) (finding that defendant’s counsel
was constitutionally ineffective when he did not properly advise defendant, who was a
lawful permanent resident, of the potential deportation risk for pleading guilty to a drugdistribution charge).
305. Kupfer, supra note 24, at 165 (“Congress has not indicated any intention to restrict
the scope of this tough-on-crime statute or more clearly define its language.” (citing David
B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97,
135–38 (2000) (explaining that it is difficult for Congress to legislate with specificity due to
its political cost))).
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crimes. This solution comports with the federal goals of treating like
offenders alike no matter where they committed their predicate crime
because; unlike the current elements-based categorical approach, conduct is
not dependent on state statutes. The conduct-based approach would also be
far more efficient than the current doctrine because sentencing judges
would not have to spend time parsing through state law; rather, they would
need only rely on Shepard documents that convey the criminal conduct of
the prior crime to determine if such conduct fits within the generic
definition of the enumerated crimes in the ACCA. Unfortunately, the
current Court seems determined to keep facts out of the equation and
continues to cling to the unworkable categorical approach.
The future of the ACCA is impossible to predict, but its current path is
precarious. The Court recently declared the ACCA’s residual clause—
which applied the ACCA to any crime that “otherwise involves conduct
that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another”306—
unconstitutionally vague in Johnson v. United States after wrestling with
inconsistent applications after only nine years and a handful of cases.307
During this short time period, justices bemoaned that the Court’s approach
to deciphering the residual clause was unworkable due to inconsistencies308
and the lack of any definite standards to determine predicate crimes in light
of the clause’s broad strokes.309 This resulted in years of circuit splits,
plaguing the residual clause’s application in the courts of appeals.310
Finally, the Court abandoned nearly a decade of precedent and found its
attempts to decipher the confusing language so devoid of applicable
standards that the clause was ultimately unconstitutionally vague.311 After
twenty-five years of circuit splits and inconsistent application of the
categorical approach as it applies to enumerated crimes like burglary, the
Court may be willing to pull the trigger and declare this portion of the
306. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012).
307. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2560 (2015).
308. Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 133 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring) (“After
almost two decades with Taylor’s ‘categorical approach,’ only one thing is clear: ACCA’s
residual clause is nearly impossible to apply consistently.”), abrogated by Johnson, 135 S.
Ct. 2551.
309. See James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 215 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting),
overruled by Johnson, 135 S. Ct 2551.
310. Chambers, 555 U.S. at 133 (Alito, J., concurring) (stating that the residual clause
“created numerous splits among the lower federal courts”).
311. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2562 (overturning its position in James and finding the
residual clause unconstitutional because “[t]he doctrine of stare decisis allows us to revisit
an earlier decision where experience with its application reveals that it is unworkable”).
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ACCA unconstitutionally vague as well given the continued inconsistency
and unworkability of the categorical approach.312
Given Congress’s inaction over the past quarter century, even when the
architect of the ACCA himself lamented the Court’s approach,313 the Court
is likely embarking on its own policy-making venture. This muddled
doctrine may indeed be the Court’s way of acting consistently with
Congress’s current intent to start dismantling the injurious vestiges of mass
incarceration and mete out a measured justice that has been missing from
federal sentencing for many decades. Such is the extent of the damage to
the categorical approach—it has become so unsound that the only thing that
makes sense any more is that the Court is maneuvering to dismantle it piece
by piece. Whatever the case may be, the categorical approach is
unsustainable from a doctrinal standpoint, and the Court must move to
remedy the problems of the doctrine if it seeks to institute a morally
responsible, efficient, and efficacious approach to punishing habitual
offenders.

312. Thus, the premium that the Court placed on precedent in Mathis could easily be
overridden given the continued practical difficulties of the categorical approach. See Mathis
v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2257 (2016).
313. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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